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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Ensuring health care to the public is fundamental to the welfare state and 
consumes a substantial part of national expenditures. Health care systems across developed 
countries face challenges of increasing demand and limited resources, and efforts are made to 
push provider organizations to increase efficiency and still maintain quality of care. The use 
of increased competition and reimbursement models to stimulate specific provider behaviors 
has gained increased attention in health care governance. However, the literature evaluating 
the impact of economic governance strategies is complex and appears inconclusive. 
Surprisingly few studies take the perspective of health care professionals, although their 
response to economic governance requirements is essential for change to occur at the 
organizational level.  
Insights from management research may enrich studies exploring professionals’ perspectives 
of economic governance by highlighting the important role of managers, who serve as a link 
between organizational demands and staff. In health care contexts, managers’ abilities to 
adapt the external demands to the care delivery process and to professional values have 
shown to be a key factor for organizational output. The literature on motivation also 
contributes by proposing that the influence of external rewards depends on its interplay with 
intrinsic motivation, based on individuals’ beliefs and preferences. Motivational research in 
the public sector proposes that the intrinsic reward from meeting patient needs is a 
particularly strong motivator for health care professionals.   
This thesis intends to bridge the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of health care systems by 
exploring how economic governance models are experienced by health care professionals 
when filtered through organizational layers (rather than the governance model itself), using 
insights from management and motivational literature to guide the studies. 
Aim: The overall aim of the thesis is to explore health care professionals’ experience of 
economic governance, at the manager and staff level. The thesis studies specifically aim to 
explore the consequences of a particular economic governance model including patient 
choice, from the perspective of professionals (Study I), the strategies managers use as 
intermediaries between the economic governance model and staff (Study II), and staff 
experiences of economic efficiency requirements in health care (Study IV). The thesis also 
includes a method study (Study III) aiming at developing a self-assessment scale, capturing 
staff experiences of governance of economic efficiency and quality, and assessing its 
psychometric properties.  
Methods: The thesis explores two empirical settings. Case 1 includes a regional patient 
choice model in elective orthopedics, including governance strategies of increased patient 
choice, increased provider competition, specialization of providers, and financial incentives. 
Case 2 includes the use of annual budgets in a public university hospital setting facing 
substantial economic constraints. In this case there is a specific focus on the Department of 
Rehabilitation Medicine. The thesis comprises multiple study designs and methods. Studies I 
and II apply an exploratory qualitative design, based on interview data from professionals in 
key positions, who hold managerial responsibilities. Study III applies methods for scale 
development and focuses on professionals at the staff level. Although the psychometric 
assessment is based on quantitative (survey) data and methods, the development process also 
includes qualitative methods. Study IV focuses on professionals at the staff level and applies 
a sequential mixed method design, using qualitative interview data to enrich the 
understanding of the survey data collected in Study III.  
Findings: Study I showed that the patient choice model had implications for the organization 
of care, for patients, for professionals’ work environments and for education and research 
activities, as perceived by professionals. Further, their analysis identified consequences at the 
provider level and for the health care system as a whole. Study II showed that professional 
managers applied strategies to function as intermediaries between the patient choice model 
and their staff, aligning external requirements with professional values. Study III describes 
the development and pilot study of the GOV-EQ scale. The scale showed promising 
psychometric qualities and captured health care staffs’ experiences of governance, including 
economic efficiency requirements (Subscale A) and quality requirements (Subscale B). Study 
IV showed that staff was knowledgeable and motivated to consider economic efficiency 
requirements in clinical work, conditioned that patients were not put at risk. Nevertheless, 
staff members experienced little influence over resource allocation and identified limitations 
to the overall system’s abilities to meet patient needs. Study IV further revealed that staff 
experiences of economic efficiency requirements included a system-level perspective, caring 
for the entire patient journey across stakeholders, and that they assessed the fairness of the 
system as a whole.   
Conclusions: The thesis concludes that professionals at the staff and manager level are well 
aware of economic efficiency requirements and intrinsically motivated to manage resources 
carefully. Their engagement does not seem limited to organizational roles, but is guided by a 
common concern that the overall health care system fairly provides value for patients and 
supports a sustainable work environment and knowledge development for the professional 
community. The thesis confirms the priority of the professional ethos and concludes that 
economic governance models should be aligned with patient needs and health care quality. 
The thesis also confirms the importance of managerial strategies that take professional values 
and motivation into account. The thesis concludes that professionals may be a valuable 
source of knowledge when evaluating economic governance strategies, having system-level 
awareness and a concern for the entire patient journey across stakeholders. The thesis 
highlights the need for increased collaboration and dialogue that brings professionals and 
policy makers together, to attain economic governance models that efficiently support (and 
balance) the multiple aims of health care and that are perceived as valid, in the sense that 
professionals find the requirements imposed on them as reasonable. 
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1 PREFACE 
Having a background as a clinical psychologist working in the field of occupational health, 
the mystery of what drives human behavior has always been of interest to me. Based on my 
experiences from working with leadership development in various occupational settings I 
have become increasingly intrigued by the complex interplay between organizational 
demands (and rewards) and individuals’ intrinsic motivation, as well as how these can be 
aligned. This riddle has also remained a central part of my thesis project. 
When I was given the opportunity to become a PhD student at the Medical Management 
Center, new fields of research opened up to me and exploring the interdisciplinary literature 
on health care governance was indeed new ground. I think the thesis is best understood by 
knowing about my background as a psychologist and by reading it as an attempt to give voice 
to the (subjective) experiences of health care professionals, who are important micro-level 
actors in a vast and highly complex health care system. 
I believe that health care professionals’ experience of the conditions for care delivery is very 
important for them to be willing (and happy) to come to work and to care for their patients. I 
hope my work in some way contributes to improving health care governance, to support a 
more efficient resource use in a manner that involves and engages health care professionals. 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
The health care system forms one of the cornerstones in the welfare state by ensuring health 
care services to its citizens. The importance of a well-functioning health care system becomes 
obvious to all of us when we find ourselves in the vulnerable position of being a patient or a 
relative of a patient, putting our hope in health care professionals’ abilities to help and to 
meet us with empathy. Health care provision requires substantial financial resources and 
health care systems across developed countries share the challenge of rising demand (and 
costs) in relation to limited financial resources (OECD, 2017). This has been explained by a 
combination of factors, such as an aging population resulting in a declining tax base, longer 
life expectancy influencing health care demand, and medical and technical innovations 
enabling new forms of care (McGrail et al., 2000; Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras, & Kutzin, 
2002). Across health care systems, improving economic efficiency is a critical factor to 
ensure that available resources will be sufficient to meet the demand of citizens in the future.  
Although the models for funding and provision of health care vary extensively across health 
care systems, governing bodies share the endeavor of designing economic governance 
models that push provider organizations to increase economic efficiency without putting 
patients at risk (Wendt, Frisina, & Rothgang, 2009). In most countries this includes the 
reliance on public and private provider organizations, and the opportunity to influence 
provider behavior through reimbursement models (i.e., provider payment) has gained 
increased attention (Cashin, Chi, Smith, Borowitz, & Thomson, 2014). Historically, fixed 
annual budgets have been extensively used in exchange for public health care provision, 
ensuring cost control for health care payers but being criticized for providing weak incentives 
for productivity and quality of care (Jegers, Kesteloot, De Graeve, & Gilles, 2002). In recent 
decades, publically funded health care systems have been inspired by mechanisms operating 
in the private markets and applications of increased competition and financial incentive 
models to stimulate certain provider behaviors have been increasingly applied (Klijn, 2008).  
Still, there seems to be no easy answer for how best to influence health care providers to 
increase efficiency. The literature evaluating the impact of economic governance strategies is 
complex (Flodgren et al., 2011), and the extensive variation in how reimbursement models 
are designed and the influence of contextual factors brings limitations to the generalizability 
of findings of specific studies. In addition, the evidence appears inconclusive. Individual 
studies show that reimbursement models may be effective in stimulating specific provider 
behaviors whereas additional studies point at the risk of unintended consequences to aspects 
of care that are not defined in the model (Flodgren et al., 2011; Glasziou et al., 2012; Scott et 
al., 2011). Although this is an area of intense debate, researchers from various fields seem to 
agree that all provider payment models come with limitations (Roland & Dudley, 2015).  
The fact that a majority of evaluation studies focus on provider-level outputs, such as costs, 
productivity, and (more rarely) quality indicators (Flodgren et al., 2011; Mandavia, Mehta, 
Schilder, & Mossialos, 2017; Scott et al., 2011), suggests that perspectives from within the 
organizations might be useful, in particular since the use of provider reimbursement relies on 
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the assumption that this will change the behaviors of those working on the ground. Although 
there is growing attention to the relevance of organizational and individual factors (Frolich, 
Talavera, Broadhead, & Dudley, 2007), surprisingly few studies take the perspective of 
professionals, although their engagement in economic governance requirements is essential 
for change to happen. Thus, studies of governance taking a professional perspective can make 
a contribution by providing insights about the conditions for behavior change in clinical 
practice, unveiling the underlying processes of organizational change.  
Insights from management research and from the motivational literature may enrich studies 
on economic governance. The literature on management emphasizes the important role of 
managers for organizational performance. Managers are described as serving as a link 
between organizational demands and individual staff members, by defining, organizing and 
coordinating relevant tasks, but also by delegating tasks in an engaging and motivating 
manner (Hales, 1999). Studies in health care settings suggest that professional managers have 
an important “hybrid” function in integrating organizational demands with the care delivery 
process (McGivern, Currie, Ferlie, Fitzgerald, & Waring, 2015), guided by professional 
expertise but also by their understanding of professional culture. Clinically experienced 
managers have shown to be a key factor for positive organizational outputs in regard to 
quality outcomes and financial performance at the provider level (Goodall, 2011; Jones et al., 
2017). However, more research is needed to explore the specific managerial strategies that 
are used to balance multiple governance requirements and how these are integrated to current 
care practices (Kuhlmann & von Knorring, 2014). 
The vast literature on motivation also provides helpful perspectives on how governance 
applications may be experienced at the professional level, by highlighting the important 
interplay between external demands and internal motivational processes related to an 
individual’s feelings, preferences and values. Motivational theory suggests that internal 
reward from doing good or from acting autonomously may have just as strong, or stronger, 
influence on behavior as external rewards (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 
2000). The motivational impact from safeguarding patient needs has shown to be particularly 
important to staff in the public sector (Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise, 2010), and the autonomy 
to meet patient needs has been described as a fundamental factor for job satisfaction among 
health care professionals (Swick, 2000). Thus, based on the motivational literature in several 
academic disciplines, health care professionals’ experience of how economic governance 
models influence the conditions for care delivery seems to be an important factor influencing 
their behavioral response.  
This thesis intends to provide knowledge about how health care professionals at the manager 
and staff level experience the economic governance of provider organizations, referring to the 
general demands of economic efficiency in health care provision. The thesis tries to bridge 
the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of health care systems by focusing on how governance 
models are perceived by professionals when filtered through organizational layers, rather than 
the governance model itself.  
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2.1 POSITIONING OF THE THESIS AND CENTRAL DEFINITIONS  
The thesis project is positioned in a highly interdisciplinary field of research and the thesis 
combines literature from several academic disciplines. Although literature on health care 
systems and governance is used to describe the complex strategies underlying health care 
provision, the thesis primarily applies a psychological perspective of economic governance 
by focusing specifically on professionals’ subjective experiences. This is partly explained by 
the scientific experience of the thesis author at the start of the thesis project. Literature on 
management, motivation, and behavior change has been used to guide the focus of the studies 
and to interpret the findings. In addition, related scientific fields such as the literature on 
policy implementation, the sociological literature on professionalism, and research on public 
service motivation have been increasingly explored. 
 
2.1.1 Definitions of central concepts 
The thesis applies a number of central concepts, of which the inherent definitions and 
meanings will be clarified below.  
2.1.1.1 Governance 
The concept of health care governance holds multiple definitions, but generally refers to how 
health care systems are governed to pursue multiple objectives, including for example how 
targets and priorities are set, how access to care and cost control is determined, and how the 
relationship between providers, professionals and patients are regulated (Klijn, 2008). 
Governance more broadly refers to “how things are done” in contrast to the specific focus on 
“what should be done” in health policy (Greer, Wismar, & Figueras, 2016). Governance 
includes government-led political processes and the reliance on market mechanisms and self-
regulation of nonpublic actors (Wendt et al., 2009). Governance applications range from 
forced regulation imposed on public service providers to soft governance initiatives using 
information and advisory guidelines to influence provider behavior through their engagement 
(Brandsen, Boogers, & Tops, 2006). 
In the thesis context, the concept of economic governance is applied, referring to the actions 
taken by governing bodies to influence the overall economic efficiency of health care 
provision (Wendt et al., 2009). In the thesis context, this includes the model for provider 
reimbursement, how health care provision is organized, and how the assignments for care 
delivery are defined at the provider level. The specific economic governance models applied 
in the thesis studies will be described in detail in the method section.  
In the thesis context, health care quality is distinguished from economic efficiency by 
applying the concept of quality governance, referring to activities undertaken by governing 
bodies to influence the quality of care. Acknowledging that health care quality holds multiple 
definitions and commonly include criteria for efficient resource use (Wiig et al., 2014), these 
concepts are distinguished in the thesis based on the general understanding of these concepts 
 14 
as separate phenomena. In the context of the thesis, health care quality refers broadly to the 
attainment of desirable patient outcomes and experience of care.  
2.1.1.2 Policy 
The term policy is occasionally used in the thesis to refer to specific policy initiatives having 
specific intentions for specific actors (such as a patient choice model). The concepts of policy 
maker and policy level are used to broadly refer to politicians, decision makers and civil 
servants representing national or regional governing bodies (Schofield & Sausman, 2004).  
2.1.1.3 Economic efficiency 
The concept of economic efficiency of health care is central to the thesis. Acknowledging the 
complexity of the concept and its multiple applications at the system and provider level, a 
general definition is applied in the thesis context, referring to the extent to which resources 
(inputs) are used in the best of ways to produce valuable outputs (Eurohealth, 2017). This 
implies that the experience of economic efficiency requirements at the professional level 
refers to their general experience of using available resources in the best of ways in relation to 
their mission, which may include a variety of resource-consuming activities or equipment.  
2.1.1.4 Provider organizations 
The concept of health care providers (or providers) is applied in the thesis, with reference to 
health care provider organizations (i.e. the organizational entity), rather than individuals 
involved in health care delivery.  
2.1.1.5 Health care professionals  
The concept of health care professionals is applied in the thesis, with reference to all 
employees working close to patients in care delivery, regardless of managerial position or 
responsibilities. Acknowledging that the concept of professionals in specific academic 
contexts postulates high levels of education and expertise (Evetts, 2003), the application of 
professionals in the thesis context includes staff members of varying competences and 
responsibilities, who are recognized as members of the overall health care workforce 
(Kickert, 1997).  
2.1.1.6 Managers and staff  
The thesis relies on the concept of managers (rather than leaders), referring to professionals in 
managerial roles holding responsibilities for managing care provision, which do not 
necessarily require a formal managerial position (Hales, 2002). The concept of managerial 
strategies will be used to refer to the actions managers take to influence staff members (and 
thereby care delivery), acknowledging that some of these strategies balance on the verge of 
what could also be classified as leadership behaviors (Yukl, 2012). The concept of staff will 
be used in the thesis with reference to professionals holding no managerial responsibilities. 
  15 
3 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES  
The thesis studies (illustrated in Figure 1) explore professionals’ experiences of two empirical 
settings, representing different applications of economic governance but also sharing 
similarities by including health care providers in specialized care, operating in two large 
urban areas in Sweden.  
Case 1 (represented in Studies I and II) illustrates the more recent trend of introducing patient 
choice in specialized care. This manifests in a regional patient choice model for elective 
orthopedics that includes increased provider competition, specialization of providers and a 
reimbursement model designed to provide incentives for quality and economic efficiency. 
Case 2 (represented in Studies III and IV) illustrates a more traditional approach to economic 
governance, by the use of annual budgets in a university hospital setting experiencing 
substantial economic pressure. This case specifically focuses on the Department of 
Rehabilitation Medicine.   
  
Figure 1. Illustrative overview of the thesis studies. 
 
The thesis studies represent different perspectives in regard to the target group. In Studies I 
and II, the study participants primarily include professionals in formal managerial positions 
or in managerial roles, who hold responsibilities of managing care and leading others. In 
Studies III and IV, the study participants include professionals who have no managerial 
duties. The study participants in all studies are clinically active or have a clinical background. 
In Studies I and II, the study participants mainly represent physicians and nurses. Studies III 
and IV target a multi-professional population, including for example physiotherapists, work 
therapists, psychologists, and nurses. 
Managers 
Case 1 
Staff 
Patient choice: Elective orthopedics 
Case 2 
Annual budget: University hospital  
Managers 
Top-management 
Staff 
Top-management 
Study II  
Study III  
Study IV  
Study I  
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4 AIM 
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore health care professionals’ experience of economic 
governance. 
The thesis includes four empirical studies with the following specific aims: 
 Study I: To explore what consequences professional managers identify as relevant, 
and why, in the context of a policy reform introducing patient choice in specialized 
care. 
 
 Study II: To explore the strategies professional managers use as intermediaries 
between a policy reform, introducing patient choice in specialized care, and the 
motivation of staff.  
 
 Study III: To develop a self-assessment scale capturing staff experiences of 
governance, defined as economic efficiency and quality requirements of health care, 
and to assess its psychometric properties. 
 
 Study IV: To increase the understanding of staff members’ experiences of economic 
efficiency requirements in health care and explore how these experiences are shaped. 
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5 BACKGROUND 
The background literature holding relevance for the thesis project addresses the macro-, 
meso-, and micro-levels of health care systems, illustrated in Figure 2. First, key 
characteristics of health care systems will be described from a macro level perspective, 
introducing the concept of economic governance (section 5.1). The Swedish health care 
system will be described separately, in section 5.1.4. Thereafter, literature targeting the meso-
level and provider organizations will be presented (section 5.2), addressing important 
characteristics of health care management and the role of managers. Last, literature targeting 
the micro-level of individual motivation and behavior will be introduced (section 5.3), 
including theoretical perspectives from multiple scientific disciplines that provide insights to 
how economic governance may influence professional behaviors in clinical practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An illustrative guide to the reading of the background literature. 
 
5.1 WHAT CONSTITUTES A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM? 
The health care sector encompasses a substantial part of national expenditures, on average 
9% of GDP in OECD countries. Health care also influences society substantially by being 
one of the largest employers, representing 10-20% of the total workforce (OECD, 2017). 
Different countries, having different historical, political, and cultural experiences, have 
chosen varying strategies for ensuring funding and provision of health care services. 
Although this makes comparisons and generalizations across countries difficult, the principles 
for funding, provision, and governance have been distinguished as key components of health 
care systems (Wendt et al., 2009). These will be further described below. Although health 
Top-management 
 
Staff 
Managers 
Background literature: 
Section 5.2 – Meso-level 
What characterizes the management 
of health care organizations?     
What is the role of managers? 
Section 5.1 – Macro-level 
What constitutes a health care 
system and what is economic 
governance? 
Health care system 
Economic governance 
Section 5.3 – Micro-level   
What drives individual motivation 
and behavior change? 
Provider 
organizations 
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care commonly is a responsibility of the public sector, both funding and provision of health 
care services may include a combination of public and private actors.  
Although diminishing economic resources has been acknowledged as one of the greatest 
challenges for health care systems, money is not everything. Health care systems hold 
multiple purposes, and economic efficiency of care delivery needs to be balanced to the 
quality of care and its ability to improve peoples’ health, when assessing to what extent a 
health care system meets its objectives. The triple aim framework has been proposed to 
support a holistic view of the purpose of health care, balancing the simultaneous pursuit of 
“improved experience of care, improved population health and reduction of the per capita 
cost of health care” (Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008). In specific countries, certain 
principles may also be emphasized, such as the central role of equity in the Swedish health 
care system (Anell, Glenngard, & Merkur, 2012).The expanded quadruple aim has also been 
proposed to explicitly acknowledge the critical role of the health care workforce for a well-
functioning health care system, and include the aim of improving the experience of care 
provision (Sikka, Morath, & Leape, 2015).  
 
5.1.1 Models for health care funding 
Health care delivery consumes substantial financial resources and since health care is 
potentially very costly, health care systems are generally organized to reduce the financial 
risk for individuals. By relying on a third-party system, in which funding is collected from the 
citizens by a (public or private) funding body, the resources are redistributed to health care 
providers, which in turn provide health care to the citizens (Mossialos et al., 2002). The levels 
of public and private funding vary across countries, but most systems apply a mix of funding 
sources. Public funding is primarily carried out through national or regional taxes, or through 
public social health insurance programs. Private funding mainly consists of health care 
insurance programs funded by employers and/or by individuals, as well as out-of-pocket-
payments (Mossialos et al., 2002). Public funding is the predominant strategy in European 
countries and in countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden public funding 
constitutes as much as 80% (or more) of the total health care spending. At the opposite side 
of the spectrum countries such as the United States and Switzerland can be found, relying 
more heavily on private funding that constitutes around 50 % of the total health care 
expenditures (OECD, 2017).    
 
5.1.2 Strategies for organizing health care provision 
To redistribute the funding collected for health care, different strategies are used to organize 
health care provision to the citizens, which include how different assignments for care 
delivery are defined for different provider organizations, but also to what extent public and 
private providers (or both) are responsible for care delivery.  
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5.1.2.1 Structural reorganization of health care providers 
By tradition, health care providers have been organized in the domains of primary, secondary, 
and tertiary care. Primary care providers should respond to common health problems and 
posit a referral function (and in some countries act as gate keepers) for transferring patients to 
secondary care. Secondary care consists of specialized types of care provided by hospitals or 
by specialized outpatient providers, ranging from low-risk elective procedures to the 
treatment of complex and chronic conditions. Tertiary care refers to highly specialized care, 
commonly centralized to regional or national hospitals. University hospitals have a central 
role in integrating care delivery with professional education and clinical research conducted 
at medical universities. Social care is in most countries separated from health care and funded 
and delivered by municipalities (Walshe & Smith, 2011). In practice, however, the 
assignments and boundaries between different providers are not crystal clear and the patient 
journey commonly requires the involvement of multiple health care providers.  
In line with the economic challenges of health care systems, there is a general concern for the 
dependency on costly hospitals and efforts are made to transfer specialized care that does not 
require hospital resources to community clinics (Walshe & Smith, 2011). The shifting of 
specialist services out of hospitals has been found effective in improving access to care, 
however at risk of reducing quality and increasing overall costs (Sibbald, McDonald, & 
Roland, 2007). As many European health care systems move toward decentralization of 
specialized care and increased autonomy for hospital providers, concerns have been raised 
that some of the benefits of the centrally managed hospitals for knowledge development and 
high level expertise might be lost (Rechel, Duran, & Saltman, 2018).  
5.1.2.2 Increased provider competition through patient choice 
The regulations for how private providers are allowed to operate in health care markets have 
changed considerably during the past decades. Historically, hierarchical state-led control of 
providers has been a fundamental component of publically funded health care systems, such 
as the English NHS. In contrast, the American health care system has for a long time relied 
on market forces and competition of private providers (Walshe & Smith, 2011). Over time, 
publically funded health care systems have, however, moved toward a mix of public and 
private actors (Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010). 
With the main purpose of increasing economic efficiency, the application of market logics 
became increasingly influential in public policy during the early 1990s. The marketization of 
health care is commonly attributed to the New Public Management (NPM) public 
administration strategy (Hood, 1995). The definition of NPM is debated (Osborne, 2006), but 
it is commonly described as including increased provider competition through increased 
patient choice and the establishment of private actors in the market, a strengthened control of 
health care providers through performance evaluation, and the application of financial 
incentives by linking provider payment to performance targets (Klijn, 2008).  
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According to marked-based theory, the best providers will be rewarded by increased demand 
when letting patients choose, and in a system where money follows the patients this provides 
incentives for improved quality of services and increased efficiency (Le Grand, 2009). 
Increased patient choice has been broadly implemented in the Northern European in 
countries, for both hospital- and primary care providers. The discourse of argumentation 
behind the reforms has varied across countries, ranging from arguments emphasizing the 
strengthening of patients’ voice to the need for increased efficiency (Vrangbaek, Robertson, 
Winblad, Van de Bovenkamp, & Dixon, 2012). The prevalence of private providers is higher 
in the primary care sector than among hospitals in most countries, although this varies 
extensively across different health care systems (Joumard et al., 2010).  
The empirical evidence of the consequences of increased patient choice is debated and the 
complexity of reforms brings challenges when designing evaluation studies. Although there 
are studies identifying positive effects on costs and patient outcomes as a result of patient 
choice and provider competition (Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, & Propper, 2013), the overall 
literature provides limited evidence that choice reforms will improve efficiency and quality of 
care. Concerns have been raised that choice reforms undermine equity of care (Fotaki, 2014; 
Fotaki et al., 2008), and critiques have been posed of the broad implementation of patient 
choice models despite the lack of knowledge of whether patients prefer to choose (Appleby & 
Dixon, 2004), have equal abilities to choose (Fotaki, 2014), and to what extent choices are 
based on quality indicators (Magee, Davis, & Coulter, 2003).  
 
5.1.3 Health care governance  
As previously defined, health care governance refers to how health care systems are governed 
to pursue their multiple objectives (Klijn, 2008), which include a variety of actions taken to 
steer public service providers to behave accordingly. Health care governance varies across 
systems with the degree of national control (centralization) and local autonomy 
(decentralization) (Saltman, 2008). The level of forced regulation in governance varies and is 
distinguished using the concept of hard and soft governance. Hard governance refers to 
hierarchically imposed regulations, such as laws and formal requirements that control 
provider behavior by determining for example patient rights and resource distribution. In 
contrast, soft governance applications aim at influencing provider behavior through 
information and advisory guidelines, relying on their engagement rather than formal 
accountability (Brandsen et al., 2006). This includes the implementation of clinical guidelines 
to support evidence-based practice and the monitoring of quality indicators and patient 
outcomes at the provider level to inform quality improvement initiatives. Soft governance has 
been proposed as more appealing to professionals as it enables their involvement in 
identifying how to improve care delivery, leaving room for innovation (Brandsen et al., 
2006). In the policy implementation literature, the key role of engaging professionals working 
at the ground level is also emphasized (Schofield & Sausman, 2004), arguing that their 
interpretation and discretion in putting governance and policy into practice substantially 
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influence the attainment of intended policy outcomes. However, the role of professional 
discretion is also debated, argued to be both a risk factor and a resource in policy 
implementation (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). In summary, multiple governance mechanisms 
that imply varying degrees of freedom of action operate in parallel to influence different 
aspects of provider behavior, to pursue the multiple aims of health care.  
5.1.3.1 Using reimbursement models to influence provider behavior 
Provider payment (also referred to as reimbursement models) is used as a means for resource 
distribution to (public and private) providers in exchange for care delivery. It can also be 
regarded as a form of (economic) governance that influences the use of economic resources, 
based on the underlying assumption that payment will influence provider behaviors in 
accordance with the logics of how reimbursement is determined. Health care providers are 
assumed to strive for maximizing financial revenues and thereby to intensify certain activities 
if reimbursement is linked to specific targets, and to increase the overall economic efficiency 
within fixed (and limited) economic boundaries (Jegers et al., 2002). Although the concept of 
financial incentive models is commonly used when there is a clear association between 
reimbursement and performance targets, all reimbursement models can be said to provide 
incentives for specific provider behaviors depending on their characteristics. The empirical 
cases included in the thesis represent two types of reimbursement: bundle payments and 
annual budgets. However, these specific models are best understood in context of the great 
variation of reimbursement models (and their underlying assumptions) and the diversity and 
complexity of studies evaluating their effects.  
Reimbursement models can broadly be defined based on when they are distributed 
(prospective vs. retrospective), what object the reimbursement is based on and to what degree 
the level of reimbursement can vary (fixed vs variable). Variable reimbursement, that is based 
on what the provider actually did, provides stronger incentives for specific provider behaviors 
than fixed reimbursement that will remain the same regardless of provider activity (Jegers et 
al., 2002). Historically, fixed reimbursement models such as annual budgeting have been 
extensively applied in publically controlled health care systems, in particular for hospital 
payment. Annual budgets are estimated beforehand, commonly based on historical data, and 
provide opportunities for health care payers to control costs and put general pressure on 
providers to manage resources efficiently. However, annual budgets have been criticized for 
providing weak incentives for productivity, increasing patient access and quality of care 
(Jegers et al., 2002). Annual budgeting is still extensively applied, but commonly in 
combination with performance- or activity-based reimbursement (Rechel, Duran, et al., 
2018). In primary care capitation payment has been more common, which consists of a lump 
sum based on the patient population that is under the responsibility of the provider. Capitation 
generally provides incentives for increasing the overall economic efficiency, but may create a 
risk of limiting access to care for vulnerable (and costly) patients (Gosden et al., 2000). 
With a growing focus on incentivizing provider performance a broad variety of 
reimbursement models linking payment to specific objects or targets have been developed 
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(Jegers et al., 2002). In activity-based models (also referred to as Fee For Service), payment 
is provided for specific care activities and these models have been extensively applied in 
primary care (Gosden et al., 2000). This provides strong incentives for increasing access to 
care and for productivity, however, it is at the risk of inducing demand for unnecessary care 
(Jegers et al., 2002). In case-based models, such as Diagnose Related Groups (DRG), the 
reimbursement is determined by the types of patients who are treated. The reimbursement 
levels are estimated beforehand for different diagnostic groups, based on typical activities and 
the average cost of treatment for typical patients. The DRG system was originally developed 
as a monitoring tool for hospital management but was later used to also govern 
reimbursement. The DRG system is assumed to provide incentives for increased efficiency, 
but has been criticized for providing incentives for strategic selection of profitable patients, 
putting vulnerable patients at risk (Jegers et al., 2002). To increase provider responsibility for 
the entire care cycle, a more universal form of case-based reimbursement, the bundle 
payment model, has been developed. Reimbursement is based on the overall cost for an entire 
care episode (for a specific patient group) and is not linked to specific provider activities. The 
bundle occasionally expands the providers’ responsibilities to include the handling of 
complications post-discharge to create incentives for increasing the quality of care during the 
initial care episode (Steele & Reilly, 2010).   
To increase focus on the outcomes of care, rather than on care activities, pay-for-performance 
(P4P) models of reimbursement have been developed, linking payment to performance 
targets. Although the intention to incentivize provider performance makes perfect sense, the 
complexity of defining valid performance targets has proved to be a challenge, as 
performance in a health care system includes many aspects, such as economic efficiency, 
quality, and accessibility (Cashin et al., 2014). The application of P4P is widespread in the 
United States and increasingly applied in European health care systems (Eijkenaar, Emmert, 
Scheppach, & Schöffski, 2013), most extensively in primary care but also in the hospital 
sector (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 2010). The empirical evidence of the impact 
of P4P-models is inconclusive (Eijkenaar et al., 2013), and there is a general concern for 
unintended consequences for care quality and for vulnerable patients, if performance targets 
are too narrowly defined and predominantly address financial performance (Glasziou et al., 
2012). However, substantial efforts have been made to identify relevant patient outcomes and 
quality indicators to be used as targets for so-called quality-based (Conrad & Perry, 2009) 
and value-based reimbursement (Conrad, 2015). 
In summary, influencing provider behavior through reimbursement models provides 
challenges in defining valid targets for desirable provider behavior. In addition, evaluation 
studies highlight the risks that efficiency gains in one end may come with negative 
consequences to other aspects of care delivery. Due to the complexity of the wide range of 
applications and provider contexts, the findings of evaluation studies are not easily 
summarized. Available reviews primarily consist of empirical studies conducted in primary 
care settings, including a wide variety of reimbursement models (Flodgren et al., 2011; Scott 
et al., 2011). In addition, review studies include research studies from health care systems that 
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are very different in many aspects (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 2010), and the 
differences across contextual settings is argued to limit the overall generalizability of findings 
(Eijkenaar et al., 2013).  
In addition, the validity of findings in evaluation studies have also been questioned based on 
methodological challenges and weaknesses in study designs, such as short follow-up times 
and great variation in methodology for assessing impact (Chaix-Couturier, Durand-Zaleski, 
Jolly, & Durieux, 2000). Evaluation studies have also been criticized for including a narrow 
scope of outcome measures (Eijkenaar et al., 2013), rarely including patient outcomes 
(Flodgren et al., 2011), which provide a limited perspective on overall success. Based on the 
complexity of assessing to what extent provider payment is a successful governance strategy, 
researchers in the field have highlighted the need for studies exploring underlying contextual 
factors, such as market composition and the type of care provided (Chaix-Couturier et al., 
2000), parallel steering mechanisms such as quality reporting (Roland & Dudley, 2015), and 
organization characteristics such as culture (Frolich et al., 2007) and leadership (Van Herck et 
al., 2010), which may influence the impact of provider payment.  
5.1.3.2 The influence of provider payment on professionals   
Although the use of provider reimbursement as a mode of economic governance relies on the 
assumption that it will change care delivery, its direct (or indirect) impact on the professional 
level has been questioned (Robinson, 2001). In publically owned provider organizations the 
majority of staff members are salaried employees, whose payment levels are not influenced 
by how providers are reimbursed (Walshe & Smith, 2011). However, private health care 
providers can be staffed by professionals who are clinically active and also have a provider 
ownership, which implies as stronger link between provider payment and a potential financial 
benefit at the individual level. This particularly applies to primary care, in which the 
penetration of self-employed primary care facilities are also common in publically funded 
health care systems such as the United Kingdom (Gosden et al., 2000). Although empirical 
studies show that that reimbursement at the provider level may influence clinical behaviors of 
physicians accordingly (Gosden et al., 2001; Melichar, 2009), experimental studies show that 
health care professionals are also motivated by factors beyond personal financial gains, such 
as providing high quality care (Kolstad, 2013) and safeguarding patient needs (Godager & 
Wiesen, 2013). Similarly, qualitative case-studies exploring the application of financial 
incentives in UK primary care settings show that professionals are concerned about being 
governed by financial incentives rather than patient needs, which appears to be at risk of 
undermining motivation (McDonald, Harrison, Checkland, Campbell, & Roland, 2007), 
reducing professional autonomy (Hackett et al., 2014), and negatively influencing the patient-
doctor relationship (Campbell, McDonald, & Lester, 2008). Overall, the implications of 
provider payment mechanisms at the professional level have not been given sufficient 
attention and the need for empirical research and conceptual models including aspects of the  
organizational and professional context in which certain reimbursement models are applied 
has been emphasized (Frolich et al., 2007). 
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5.1.4 The Swedish case 
5.1.4.1 Aim and funding strategy 
The Swedish health care system can be described as a socially responsible system ensuring 
universal access to health care for residents regardless of nationality. The Swedish health care 
system has one of highest proportions (84%) of public funding in international comparisons 
(OECD, 2017) and is primarily funded through local income taxes. The Swedish health care 
system is guided by three core principles of equal rights to care, solidarity and need-based 
access to care, and cost-effectiveness (Anell et al., 2012). Sweden has a highly decentralized 
health care system giving considerable freedom to the 21 regions that are responsible for 
funding and organizing health care to the regional population. Other welfare services, such as 
social care and elder care are funded and organized at the local level by municipalities 
(Rechel, Maresso, et al., 2018). The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs is responsible for 
health policy at the national level, focusing on improving national coordination of care and 
reducing regional differences (Anell et al., 2012). 
5.1.4.2 Structural change of health care provision and the influence of NPM 
Like other developed countries, Sweden faces the challenges of increasing demand and 
limited resources in the health care sector. On a structural level, Swedish health care has 
moved from relying extensively on hospital inpatient care toward transferring patients to 
hospital outpatient care and to primary care facilities. The (costly) intensive care has been 
concentrated to acute-care hospitals and highly specialized care is provided at the seven 
public university hospitals, also having a key role in the education of health care 
professionals and in clinical research (Anell et al., 2012).  
Since the 1980s, there has been growing attention to cost control which has paved the way for 
the growing influence of NPM. The Swedish health care system has undergone major 
reforms during the past decades to increase efficiency and responsiveness, such as increased 
corporatization of public providers, splitting purchasing and provision of public services into 
separate organizational entities,  increasing patient choice, and the establishment of private 
providers in the health care market (Saltman, 2015). However, the local implementation of 
reforms differs substantially across regions.  Giving patients the right to choose providers was 
accepted and implemented by all regions in 1991 (Vrangbaek et al., 2012). Choice was 
initially not linked to the freedom of establishment of private providers, but after this was 
made mandatory in primary care in 2010 the emergence of private providers has increased 
substantially, in particular in large urban areas (Anell, 2015; Anell et al., 2012). In specialized 
care patient choice reforms and the establishment of private providers has also increased, 
mainly targeting elective care. 80% of patient choice models in specialized care are 
concentrated in Stockholm, Uppsala, and Skåne. Although private specialized providers have 
been established and a few privately owned hospitals exist in Sweden, public providers still 
dominate specialized care (Anell, 2013). 
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The impact of choice reforms in Sweden is debated. In primary care, the choice reform seems 
to have increased access to care (Glenngård, 2015), although studies also indicate that 
privileged subgroups may have benefited more from the reform, putting citizens with low 
incomes and serious diseases at risk (Anell, 2015; Burström, 2009). Generally, there is a lack 
of knowledge on how increased choice has influenced quality outcomes, cost-efficiency, and 
equity (Anell, 2015; Glenngård, 2015). In specialized care, evaluations show that the 
introduction of patient choice has increased the establishment of private providers and 
increased the productivity of care but more knowledge is needed to assess the general effects 
of choice in specialized care (Myndigheten för Vårdanalys, 2014). Local evaluations show 
that patient characteristics differs across private and public providers in regard to income and 
education (Wohlin et al., 2016), which may explain some of the observed variation in quality 
indicators across providers (Myndigheten för Vårdanalys, 2014). In general, uncertainties 
also remain in regard to patients’ awareness of their opportunity to choose (Vrangbaek et al., 
2012). 
5.1.4.3 Governance characteristics 
The Swedish health care system is highly decentralized, and governance is primarily 
conducted at a regional level, through the interaction between the regional governing bodies 
and provider organizations (Fredriksson, Blomqvist, & Winblad, 2012). However, national 
governance strategies are occasionally applied to reduce regional differences or to support 
specific challenges (Anell et al., 2012), such as the national waiting-time guarantee 
introduced in 2005 to improve access to care (Winblad & Andersson, 2010). 
The Swedish system uses multiple soft governance applications to support health care 
quality, for example, by the use of national guidelines for health care provision based on best 
available evidence (Myndigheten för Vårdanalys, 2015), and by making provider 
performance of quality indicators available through regional comparisons (“Öppna 
jämförelser”) (SKL, 2018b). In addition, substantial financial support from the regional and 
national government has been provided to the national quality registers, collecting extensive 
data on patient outcomes, which are used to inform local and regional work on quality 
improvement (Rosen, 2010). Although NPM has increased the focus on economic efficiency 
in care provision, the current mode of governance represents a comprehensive performance 
paradigm also paying attention to quality indicators and patient outcomes (Anell et al., 2012). 
5.1.4.4 Reimbursement models in the Swedish context 
Public funding is distributed to public and private providers through provider reimbursement,  
and private providers’ access to public funding is controlled by local regulations for 
accreditation (Anell et al., 2012). The issue of how financial resources are transferred to 
providers has received growing attention in Sweden. Historically, the use of fixed annual 
budgets was criticized for providing insufficient incentives for productivity and efficiency, 
and as part of the NPM agenda these were replaced by performance- and activity-based 
reimbursement. Today most regions apply a mix of reimbursement models. In primary care, 
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capitation predominates, and it is commonly combined with a lower degree of performance-
related reimbursement linked to specific targets. For hospitals, annual budgets still represent 
the fundamental principle for reimbursement in all regions, although they are being combined 
with variable reimbursement models, such as DRG. In regions that apply patient choice in 
specialized care, the bundle payment model has been applied, including efforts to link 
payment to patient outcomes (Lindgren, 2014).  
The risk of unintended consequences when applying activity- or performance-based 
reimbursement has been increasingly discussed in Sweden, in particular in regard to negative 
impact on quality and increased administrative burden for health care professionals. A recent 
governmental investigation concluded that the complexity of reimbursement models should 
be carefully considered and that all models come with the risk of adverse consequences. 
Further, it is proposed that reimbursement models should not be the primary focus in health 
care governance and that other steering mechanisms to improve the quality of public services 
should be developed and applied (SOU 2017:56, 2017). In specific regions annual budgeting 
has been reintroduced in the public hospital sector to replace DRG, in an attempt to increase 
the mandate at the provider level to decide upon how resources are used optimally (Ellegård 
& Glenngård, 2018). 
5.1.4.5 The influence of economic governance on health care professionals  
The vast majority of Swedish health care professionals are salaried staff, employed by public 
and private health care providers, and professionals are to a low degree influenced by 
provider reimbursement. However, the strategies of economic governance are still a matter of 
concern within the professional community. Empirical studies exploring the implications of 
NPM reforms have shown quite heterogeneous reactions among subgroups of professionals, 
ranging from resistance to welcoming, dependent on the responsibilities embedded in 
different professional roles (Blomgren, 2003). Research on local applications of NPM-
inspired control models show that the awareness of productivity and resource restrictions 
increases among clinical staff, not necessarily being in conflict with professional autonomy 
(Liff & Andersson, 2011). However, studies of control models including performance-based 
payment have shown that the logics of linking reimbursement to specific care activities may 
be misaligned with the needs of specific patients, forcing professionals to outwit the systems 
and find creative ways to sufficiently meet individual needs (Brorström, Hallin, & Kastberg, 
2004). 
Media reports about the growing frustration among health care professionals have also 
influenced the debate on health care governance in Sweden, highlighting for example the 
increased administrative burden and unintended consequences for patients as a result of 
DRG-based payment (Dagens Nyheter 2013, Artikelserie: Den olönsamma patienten, 
Zaremba, M) and the concern over reimbursement logics overshadowing patient needs, 
negatively influencing professionals’ job-satisfaction (Dagens Medicin 2018, Artikel: 
Diagnoskoder sprutar ur öronen på mig, Isacsson, M). The need for increased trust and 
involvement of professionals in the governance of public services has been emphasized by 
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the recent governmental investigation The delegation of trust (Tillitsdelegationen), which 
proposes that increased professional autonomy to provide high quality services should 
characterize future modes of governance of the welfare sector to better utilize professional 
competence and skills (SOU 2018:47, 2018). 
 
5.2 HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT  
The idea of using national and regional governance to steer health care systems relies on the 
assumption that provider organizations will respond to the external demands imposed on 
them. Thus, the management of provider organizations plays a key role in incorporating 
governance objectives to the objectives of the organization, transforming system-level 
requirements into local guidelines and practices that will ultimately influence care delivery. 
Nevertheless, the program logics illustrating how governance applications should be turned 
into practice are rarely articulated. Insights from the organizational- and management 
literature provide useful perspectives unpacking the black box of organizations, exploring the 
process of how external demands are integrated in internal structures and processes of an 
organization. Within the realms of this thesis, two aspects of management are particularly 
relevant. First is the organizational logics that characterize how work generally is organized 
and managed in health care organizations. Second, the role of managers acting as a link 
between top-management decisions and clinical staff is key to defining and coordinating 
tasks that are perceived as relevant but also spark engagement at the staff level.  
 
5.2.1 Organizational logics  
In the organizational literature, various descriptions of the ideal type of organization can be 
found, describing how internal processes and structures can be designed to optimize 
efficiency and goal attainment. The improvement of work processes has historically relied 
heavily on standardization and coordination of tasks, in response to stable and predictable 
problems. Although modern organizational theory recognizes goal complexity and the 
importance of flexibility and adaption, the image of organizations as predictable, machine-
like creatures remains (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2015). This also applies to health care 
governance that in many respects assumes that provider organizations will respond to 
external governance requirements in a predictable manner. Still, health care organizations 
have historically been regarded as insusceptible of external demands, based on the high 
degree of professional involvement in management. Management structures have been based 
on professional hierarchy (Walshe & Smith, 2011), and performance evaluation has relied on 
professional peer-review rather than government control (Bauchner, Fontanarosa, & 
Thompson, 2015).  
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5.2.1.1 The influence of (hybrid) professionalism in health care management  
The strong influence and power of professionals in health care organizations has been 
extensively explored in the sociological literature. Professionals are defined  as occupational 
groups characterized by having (scientific) expert knowledge that mandates them to conduct 
their professional duties with a high degree of autonomy (Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 2001). 
Professionalism has also been positioned as “the third logic”, contrasting the logics of 
managerialism and that of the market, assuming countervailing powers and conflict 
(Freidson, 2001). Professional autonomy is described as fundamental to the professional role; 
however, the underlying reason for this is debated. The two predominating (and partly 
opposing) interpretations of professional autonomy describe it as an altruistic value system 
(which will be further explored in section 5.3) or as a means for power, securing 
professionals’ elite position when under threat of political or managerial dominance (Evetts, 
2003).  
Professional autonomy has been increasingly challenged by health care reforms derived from 
the NPM paradigm, which in practice has resulted in more management control functions to 
govern professional behaviors in health care organizations. This includes systems for audit 
and knowledge management, clinical guidelines and financial incentives (Walshe & Smith, 
2011), and the overall number of managerial positions has increased (Numerato, Salvatore, & 
Fattore, 2012). Although arguments about NPM undermining the core principles of health 
care has strongly influenced the debate (Le Grand, 2003), a substantial body of empirical 
studies show transformative capacities of professionals being able to integrate quality and  
cost-efficiency requirements (Kirkpatrick, Jespersen, Dent, & Neogy, 2009; Kuhlmann & 
Burau, 2008). New forms of  so-called “hybrid” professionalism have been proposed, to help 
overcome the managerialism-professionalism dichotomy to better fit contemporary health 
care requirements (Noordegraaf, 2007, 2011). To sum up, the role of management has 
become more prominent in health care, balancing external demands and internal structures 
and processes for health care provision. Despite the increased use of economic governance 
strategies to influence provider behaviors, there is a lack of theoretical models clarifying how 
such incentives should work in practice and what factors at the organizational and managerial 
levels that could facilitate or mitigate their impact (Frolich et al., 2007). 
 
5.2.2 The role of managers 
Managerial behavior has been found highly important for organizational goal attainment, and 
is generally described as the planning, organization and coordination of tasks (Hales, 1999). 
Contemporary conceptualizations of managerial roles emphasize the importance of 
reciprocity and trust (rather than hierarchical power) between managers and staff (Hales, 
2002), and in that sense managerial behavior shares many similarities with that of leadership. 
Leadership is generally defined as behaviors to influence and motivate others, emphasizing 
the relational quality of the interaction, which does not require a formal managerial position. 
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Thus, one can act like a leader without being a manager, and managers can conduct 
leadership to positively influence staff motivation and performance (Yukl, 2012). In health 
care organizations there is a vast variety of managerial roles, ranging from top level 
management to professionals who are responsible for managing care delivery (Arman, 
Dellve, Wikström, & Törnström, 2009). Although the rise of managerialism has been 
described as part of recent policy trends, professionals still hold a substantial proportion of 
managerial positions in health care organizations (Kuhlmann et al., 2013).  
5.2.2.1 The influence of (hybrid) managers on health care provision  
Like in other organizational contexts, health care managers have shown to have a key role for 
organizational outcomes, going as far as influencing mortality rates (West et al., 2002). 
Empirical studies suggest that the integration of managerial and professional considerations is 
essential to managerial work in health care organizations. This includes the coordination of 
tasks that arise from the care process, but more importantly the balancing of multiple 
stakeholder perspectives, such as the patients’, the professionals’ and that of the organization 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1993; Strauss, 1988). The presence of professional experience among 
managers has proved to be particularly important for desirable provider performance 
(Goodall, 2011; Lega, Prenestini, & Spurgeon, 2013). Professional experience is argued to 
positively influence the management of care as such, but also that it includes the ability to 
adapt the leadership style to the professional culture (Postma, Oldenhof, & Putters, 2015).  
The presence of professional expertise in management has shown to positively influence 
provider quality, at the level of boards (Jones et al., 2017), at the level of top-management 
(Goodall, 2011) and at the level of clinical departments and units (Lega et al., 2013). In 
addition, the involvement of professional managers in budgetary work has been shown to 
contribute to more positive attitudes among professionals toward economic efficiency 
requirements (Macinati, 2010) and to improved financial performance at the provider level 
(Macinati & Rizzo, 2016). Similarly, studies of professional managers’ mental models show 
their abilities to positively integrate cost constraints and quality, in a way in which efforts to 
work more efficiently are seen as something that potentially could improve quality, by 
reducing unnecessary care activities (Storkholm, Mazzocato, Savage, & Savage, 2017). 
Although substantial empirical research suggests advantages of integrating multiple 
perspectives in health care management, such “hybridity” is mainly studied from the 
perspective of managers and more knowledge is needed on how staff integrates multiple 
demands on health care delivery. 
 
5.3 INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR 
As previously stated, the idea of using economic governance strategies to influence health 
care providers relies on the idea that this will change the behaviors of professionals involved 
in care delivery. In the literature taking an individual perspective on behavior change 
processes, individual motivation is described as a key factor, defined as the energy and 
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intention behind behaviors (Ryan & Deci, 2000). In addition, motivational theories from 
several academic disciplines acknowledge the importance of intrinsic sources of motivation, 
suggesting that the motivational impact of external demands (and rewards) depends on its 
alignment with individual preferences. From the perspective of the thesis, the motivational 
literature suggests that professionals’ experiences of how economic governance models 
influence them as individuals, as well as the conditions for them to fulfil their professional 
duties, are important factors that might influence their behavioral response. 
 
5.3.1 Self-determination theory 
Self-determination theory (SDT) originates from the field of psychology and is increasingly 
applied in organizational research and in studies on occupational health (Gagné & Deci, 
2005). SDT acknowledges multiple sources of motivation behind actions and emphasize the 
role of intrinsic reward for increasing motivation, which occurs from activities that are 
inherently interesting, meaningful, or enjoyable. According to SDT, all individuals strive 
toward self-development by satisfying the needs of acting autonomously, developing new 
competences and experiencing relatedness to others (Deci & Ryan, 2000). STD also 
recognizes external sources of motivation to drive behavior, referring to valued consequences 
in the external environment such as material rewards or praise from others. However, SDT 
emphasizes the interplay between external and internal reward processes and assumes that the 
motivational effect of external reward is dependent on its coherence with an individual’s 
values (so-called internalization). Based on the level of internalization, external reward can 
range from having no effect on motivation to evoking active personal commitment (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000). By stating that external reward is not necessarily motivating, SDT challenges 
other motivational theories assuming intrinsic and external rewards to be additive (Van den 
Broeck, Vansteenkiste, & De Witte, 2008).  
A large body of studies and meta-analyses suggest that intrinsic motivation has a higher and 
more sustainable impact on behavior over time, compared with external reward (Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). External reward also risks undermining intrinsic motivation, 
depending on its relationship to individual preferences (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This so-called 
“crowding out effect” has been observed in multiple experimental studies, but is still 
questioned and heavily debated (Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001). Studies of SDT in 
organizational settings show that managerial support of intrinsic motivation is related to high 
performance and well-being (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004) and potentially a motivational 
factor superior to monetary reward (Olafsen, Halvari, Forest, & Deci, 2015).  
 
5.3.2 Behavioral change theories 
Theories on behavior change contribute further to the thesis project by identifying 
knowledge, skills, and the environmental context as important determinants for behavior 
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change in addition to motivation (Michie et al., 2005). According to Operant conditioning 
theory motivation is regarded as something that arises from the consequences of individuals’ 
interactions with their environments, rather than something that is intrinsically derived. 
Behavior is explained to be a function of antecedents, that trigger behaviors and the 
consequences of behaviors that could have both a reinforcing (when perceived as positive) or 
inhibitory effect (when perceived as negative) on future behavior (Skinner, 1963). 
Antecedents may provide important information about what to do, although consequences are 
assumed to represent the main motivational force. Empirical studies applying operant models 
of leadership have shown that performance can be improved by designing work settings to 
systematically provide positive consequences, such as managerial feedback, contingent with 
desired behaviors (Komaki, Minnich, Grotto, Weinshank, & Kern, 2011; Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 2003). 
As numerous theories identifying determinants of behavior change exist, efforts have been 
made to synthesize overlapping theories (Michie et al., 2005). In the field of implementation 
science, the COM-B model proposes capability, opportunity, and motivation as main 
determinants for behavior. Capability includes an individual’s physical and psychological 
capacity, such as knowledge and skills, to engage in the desired behavior. The concept of 
motivation includes all cognitive and emotional processes that direct and energize behavior. 
Opportunity includes aspects of the physical and social environment that make desired 
behaviors possible. The COM-B model is described as an interactive system, which means 
that capability, opportunity, and motivation are assumed to influence behavior. However, 
enacting a behavior may also influence capability, opportunity, and motivation in reversed 
order, which implies that behavior change may change the determinants for future behaviors 
(Michie, Van Stralen, & West, 2011).  
 
5.3.3 Motivation in behavioral economics  
The expanding field of behavioral economics share similarities with SDT by proposing that 
internal and external reward has relevance for motivation in organizational settings (Ellingsen 
& Johannesson, 2007). A central assumption in classic economic theory is the linear 
relationship between monetary reward (incentives) and increased motivation and effort 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2003), which finds substantial support in empirical studies on the 
provision of economic incentives in firms (Prendergast, 1999). However, empirical studies 
also show that economic incentives may backfire on intrinsic motivation (Frey & Jegen, 
2001; Gneezy et al., 2011), and the debate of a potential crowding out effect links the fields 
of behavioral economics and psychology together (Ryan & Deci, 2000).   
Similar to SDT, intrinsic motivation is described as being derived from activities “worth 
doing for the sake of it” (Frey, 1997). In the field of behavior economics, intrinsic motivation 
from prosocial (altruistic) behavior has gained much attention, and been used to explain 
engagement in activities such as charity and non-profit organizations that are costly for the 
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individual (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2007). The loss of the positive experience of engaging 
in altruistic behavior also serves as a plausible explanation for the crowding out effect 
(Gneezy et al., 2011). The experience of doing good is assumed to be spoiled by accepting 
“selfish” monetary compensation (reducing the overall motivation) (Benabou & Tirole, 
2003), and the altruistic preference of staff has been argued to make financial incentives 
function differently in public versus private organizations (Dixit, 1997).  
According to empirical studies, intrinsic motivation can also be derived from activities that 
generate self-esteem and pride through the interaction with a social environment (Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2008). Social recognition and respect from others have been proposed as a 
potentially preferred motivator explaining why symbolic rewards may have stronger 
motivational effects than monetary rewards (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2007). 
 
5.3.4 Professionalism and professional values  
As previously noted, the sociological literature on professionalism identifies professional 
values to meet patient needs as a fundamental motivational factor characterizing professionals 
(Freidson, 2001; Swick, 2000) By emphasizing altruistic motives this literature shares many 
similarities with the field of behavioral economics. The professional value system (ethos) 
includes a commitment to protecting individual patients but also to protecting social justice 
and fairness for all patients (Sox et al., 2002). The motivational profile of professionals has 
been argued to have major implications for organizational and managerial strategies in the 
health care context (Le Grand, 2003), emphasizing the importance of alignment between 
organizational level demands and professional values (Madara & Burkhart, 2015). 
 
5.3.5 Public service motivation  
The research on public service motivation (PSM) shares similarities with the professional 
literature by emphasizing the specific motivational preference of staff in the public sector. 
This includes health care professional, but also other occupational groups employed in public 
services. PSM is defined as an altruistic motivational profile characterizing public servants, 
which includes a concern for the interest of the larger community of citizens, going beyond 
organizational and personal gains (Perry et al., 2010; Vandenabeele, 2007). PSM has been 
distinguished from other theories of intrinsic motivation in that it emphasizes the experience 
of purpose and meaning as main motivators, rather than satisfaction of personal needs (Grant, 
2008). Although continuously debated, there is empirical evidence to support the existence of 
PSM (Bright, 2008); for example studies observing high levels of PSM among employees in 
the public sector, such as nurses, teachers, social workers and fire fighters (Vandenabeele, 
Brewer, & Ritz, 2014). Strong engagement in altruistic behaviors (Rainey, 1982) and lower 
ranking of external rewards has also been observed among public servants, when compared to 
employees in the private sector (Crewson, 1997; Georgellis, Iossa, & Tabvuma, 2011). 
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6 METHODS 
The method section is introduced by a general description of the underlying assumptions of 
the research strategies and methods used in the thesis. Thereafter the empirical settings and 
the specific study designs and methods will be described in detail.  
 
6.1 RESEARCH STRATEGIES  
Scientific research can be described in simple terms as activities that aim to describe and 
explain complex phenomena. However, different types of scientific research are guided by a 
set of underlying assumptions, often called paradigms, shared by communities of scientists.  
A research paradigm includes assumptions about the “reality” that is investigated (ontology), 
the relationship between that reality and the scientist (epistemology), and shared views of 
what techniques (methodology) that are appropriate to obtain valid knowledge (Healy & 
Perry, 2000). The thesis studies apply qualitative and quantitative methods representing 
different research paradigms, and although this thesis will not do justice to the extensive 
scientific debate of ontology and epistemology, a brief introduction to the underlying 
assumptions of the methods used is necessitated.  
Post-positivism is commonly positioned as the dominant paradigm, in particular in natural 
sciences, assuming there is a reality that can be objectively observed and described. 
Quantitative methods are commonly used for data collection and analysis. Research studies 
commonly use randomly selected representative samples and findings are thereby assumed to 
be generalizable to larger populations. Studies are typically based on testing hypotheses 
derived from theory, using experimental designs to gain knowledge about causal effects, 
although explorative approaches may also be applied (Healy & Perry, 2000). Constructivism 
represents a contrasting paradigm, emphasizing subjectivity and that multiple legitimate 
interpretations exist in parallel in the minds of different observers. This also implies that 
researchers will influence reality when studying it. Methodologically the constructivist 
paradigm relies heavily on qualitative methods (Healy & Perry, 2000), which generally seek 
to explore and understand complex subjective phenomena (Bradley, Curry, & Devers, 2007). 
This is done through systematic collection and interpretation of textual data, derived from 
interviews, real-life observations, and documents (Malterud, 2001a). In the qualitative field, 
studies do not primarily aim to identify generalizable findings, and participant selection 
strategies focus on identifying participants who serve the study purpose rather than being 
representative of a larger population (Mays & Pope, 1995). A combination of objectivity and 
subjectivity has been termed the realism paradigm, arguing that there is an objective reality 
although it cannot be perfectly objectively studied. A realism standpoint encourages both 
quantitative and qualitative methods and to a larger extent considers qualitative findings to be 
generalizable to other realities, compared to constructivist approaches to qualitative research 
(Healy & Perry, 2000). Thus, the theoretical and epistemological assumptions guiding 
qualitative studies vary, and qualitative methods should not be regarded as a uniform method. 
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In addition, the role of theory in qualitative studies should not be underestimated and 
deductive approaches in which theory is used to guide the analysis may just as well be 
appropriate (Bradley et al., 2007). 
Historically, there has been a sharp distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. 
However, the disadvantages of methodological rigidity are increasingly acknowledged and 
the field of mixed method research, combining quantitative and qualitative methods, is 
increasingly recognized. Mixed method research is commonly attributed to the paradigm of 
pragmatism, emphasizing the usefulness of multiple perspectives and theories (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Although pragmatism shares many similarities with realism, their 
unique features have been debated (Montague, 1909). 
This thesis combines quantitative and qualitative methods to explore subjective phenomena 
and thereby takes a pragmatic position, acknowledging the usefulness of multiple methods 
and perspectives. The studies are primarily explorative and great attention has been paid to 
how qualitative and quantitative data are interpreted. Although the studies do not serve the 
purpose of hypothesis testing, theory has partially been used to guide the analysis and 
interpretation of data. The qualitative studies included in the thesis are best understood as 
reflecting the assumptions of realism, rather than constructionism, in the sense that the 
qualitative findings have been regarded as knowledge that can also be valid in other settings, 
although on a conceptual or a theoretical level.  
 
6.2 OVERVIEW OF STUDY DESIGNS AND METHODS  
This thesis combines several study designs and methods (presented in Table 1). Studies I and 
II apply an explorative qualitative design, based on interview data. The studies are conducted 
in the same empirical setting (Case 1) including different provider types (although comparing 
them is not the primary purpose). Studies III and IV are conducted in one empirical setting 
(Case 2), including multiple organizational units and professional groups. The studies are 
cross-sectional in the sense that data were collected during a focused period of time with no 
longitudinal follow up. Study III is a method study designed to develop and assess a self-
assessment scale and to assess its psychometric properties. Although the psychometric 
assessment is based on quantitative (survey) data and statistical methods, the development 
process also includes qualitative methods. Study IV mixes methods, using qualitative 
interviews to enrich the interpretation of quantitative survey data.  
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Table 1. Study characteristics.  
 Study 1 Study II Study III Study IV 
Empirical 
setting 
Patient choice in  
specialized care 
(Case 1) 
Patient choice in 
specialized care 
(Case 1) 
Annual budgets in a public 
university hospital  
(Case 2) 
Annual budgets in a public 
university hospital  
(Case 2) 
Design  
Explorative 
qualitative 
interview study 
Explorative 
qualitative 
interview study 
Development and 
psychometric assessment 
of a self-assessment scale 
Sequential explanatory 
mixed method study 
Sampling 
strategy 
Purposeful 
sampling 
Purposeful 
sampling 
Purposeful sampling 
(interviews), 
total sampling (survey) 
Total sampling (survey),  
purposeful  sampling 
(focus group interviews) 
Study 
participants 
Health care 
professionals in 
key positions 
Health care 
professionals in 
key positions with 
managerial roles 
Multi-professional staff  Multi-professional staff  
Data 
sources 
Individual 
interviews  
Individual 
interviews  
Literature searches, 
interviews , cognitive 
interviews, survey data  
Survey data,              
focus group interviews 
Data 
analysis  
Deductive and  
inductive (hybrid) 
thematic analysis  
Deductive and  
inductive (hybrid) 
thematic analysis 
Deductive thematic 
analysis, Exploratory Factor 
Analysis, reliability analysis, 
correlations, multiple 
regression models 
Descriptive statistics, 
deductive and inductive 
thematic analysis 
 
6.3 EMPIRICAL CASE 1 – PATIENT CHOICE IN SPECIALIZED CARE 
Studies I and II were conducted in collaboration with provider organizations accredited for a 
local patient choice model for elective hip- and knee-replacements, which was introduced in 
the Stockholm region in 2009. Historically, all hip- and knee-replacements had been handled 
by regional hospitals, but the reform gave patients with a low-risk profile freedom to choose 
their provider. Private specialized providers were invited to the market, moving parts of the 
elective surgery out of hospitals. At the time of the reform, waiting times for elective surgery 
were long and the reform was, apart from introducing choice, a way of increasing regional 
capacity for care provision. No production limits were put on providers (Wohlin et al., 2016). 
The regional hospitals, however, remained responsible for elective surgery for high-risk 
patients, on a separate contract. At the time of Studies I and II (2016), eleven providers were 
accredited and 44 % of elective hip- and knee-replacements were conducted in hospitals. The 
remaining 56 % were performed at private specialized providers.  
The patient choice model covered a well-defined care episode, including diagnosis, surgery 
for hip- and knee-replacement, post-operative care and follow up. However, the assessment 
of suitability for surgery and (if applicable) referral to the patient choice providers were 
supposed to be handled within primary care. In addition, post-operative rehabilitation was not 
included in the care episode.  The risk assessment of patients was based on American Society 
of Anesthesiologists (ASA) guidelines, and ASA 1 & 2 was required for inclusion. A bundle 
payment model was used for reimbursement, including a lump sum payment to cover all 
provider costs. A small percentage of the bundle payments were conditioned by a number of 
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performance-targets, mainly represented by process-indicators. The overall reimbursement 
level was lowered at the introduction of the patient choice model, which put pressure on 
providers to increase efficiency of resource use. Additional financial pressure was put on 
providers by a complication guarantee, which made providers financially responsible for all 
complications occurring up to two years after surgery. Major complications, such as 
infections, were to be handled only in hospitals, and if patients were affected while in care of 
a specialized provider, that provider was obliged to cover the cost of hospital care. Quality of 
care at the provider level was monitored at the regional level, using data from the local 
patient administrative system and the national quality registry. Local evaluations have shown 
that the choice reform was associated with increased productivity, substantial cost reduction 
and reduced risks of post-operative infections. However uncertainties remain whether or not 
this represents a general (national) trend or is a consequence of the reform (Wohlin et al., 
2016).  
The case holds relevance for the thesis by illustrating a form of economic governance that 
includes patient choice in specialized care, increased provider competition and the use of 
financial incentives. The case also represents the trend of structural transformation in moving 
elective care out of hospitals to specialized providers, and the general pressure put on 
providers to increase economic efficiency. With reference to the thesis aim, the economic 
governance model of Case 1 can be assumed to create requirements for providers (and 
thereby for professionals) to increase economic efficiency of services while maintaining (or 
increasing) quality, particularly regarding post-operative infections.  
 
6.4 DESCRIPTION OF METHODS – STUDIES I & II 
6.4.1 Study design 
Studies I and II were exploratory qualitative studies based on interview-data, taking the 
perspectives of health care professionals who hold managerial responsibilities. Studies I and 
II were conducted in an integrated manner within one empirical setting (Case 1), exploring 
two different issues through simultaneous data collection involving the same study 
participants. This implies that questions that addressed the aims of Studies I and II were 
combined into one interview guide, used in one interview session for each participant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An overview of the data collection and analysis for Studies I and II. 
Study design 
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of participants 
Study I 
Study II 
Data 
collection  
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Data 
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Definition 
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Inductive 
coding 
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This approach was found appropriate based on the topics of Studies I and II being 
interrelated, but also with regard to taking the limited time of participants into account. Since 
Studies I and II share many similarities an integrated description of the steps for data 
collection and analysis will follow (illustrated in Figure 3). Specific considerations or actions 
taken for any of the studies will be clarified.  
It is worth noting that the concepts of managers and professionals are slightly different in the 
thesis when compared to those in the scientific papers for Studies I and II. In the first 
scientific paper, the participants are referred to as professionals (not clarifying their 
managerial responsibilities), focusing on their professional analysis of the consequences of 
the patient choice model. In the second scientific paper the participants are referred to as 
managers, focusing on their managerial strategies. While both descriptions are true, in the 
thesis the concept of professionals is mainly used to refer to the wider community of 
professionals at both the manager and staff level. 
 
6.4.2 Data collection 
6.4.2.1 Sampling strategies 
A purposeful sampling strategy was used for Studies I and II at both provider and individual 
level. The patient choice model involves multiple provider types. Therefore, a broad 
representation of private and public providers, as well as hospitals and specialized providers, 
was found appropriate to capture a broad range of experiences. First, all accredited providers 
(N=11) were invited to participate in the study by contacting the operations managers (at 
department or unit level) by an introductory email and follow-up phone-calls. Four hospitals 
and one specialized provider volunteered. To get a better representation of provider types 
efforts were made to recruit additional specialized providers. In total six providers were 
included in the study. This included two specialized, privately owned (for-profit) providers 
and four hospitals, three of which are owned and run by the region and one that is a privately 
owned (for-profit) provider. All hospitals participating in the study also handled hip- and 
knee-replacements of high risk patients (ASA 3 and 4) on a separate contract. Two 
specialized providers declined participation due to reorganization and limited resources. The 
remaining providers did not respond to the invitation.  
A purposeful sampling strategy was used also at an individual level, aiming to recruit health 
care professionals at key positions with experience from care delivery within the patient 
choice model. Participants with a managing role or function, not necessarily requiring a 
formal managerial position, were preferred since Study II focused specifically on managerial 
strategies. Efforts were also made to recruit participants of different professional 
backgrounds. All operations managers were asked to participate in interviews. Thereafter 
additional participants were recruited in dialogue with the operations managers, who reached 
out to staff members of appropriate experience, putting them in contact with the researchers. 
In total, one person declined participation during the recruitment period.  
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6.4.2.2 Procedures  
In total, 19 interviews were conducted by the thesis author in 2016 (June-November), lasting 
45-60 minutes. All interviews were held face-to-face on the site of the provider, except one 
over the phone, and all interviews were digitally recorded. All participants were informed 
about the aim of the study and that participation was voluntary, both during the interview 
session and in writing. All participants were given the opportunity to ask questions. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants.  
A semi-structured interview guide was designed prior to the interviews that combined 
questions relevant for Studies I and II (see Appendix A).  The interview guide addressed a 
number of major topics: the knowledge and understanding of the patient choice model in 
relation to the participant’s role, the consequences of the patient choice model, strategies to 
manage the model in daily practice and the participants’ understanding of staff motivation. 
The interview guide included a number of pre-defined questions, such as “What are the 
consequences of the model for you organization?” and “How do you adjust your leadership in 
relation to the patient choice model?”. Substantial room was left for follow up questions. 
Based on the exploratory nature of the studies participants were also encouraged to expand 
their reasoning throughout the interviews. The interview guide was piloted in the first two 
interviews, and minor adjustments were made mainly by shortening the list of questions, 
leaving more room for the participants’ reflections.  
 
6.4.3 Study participants 
The study participants (n=19) included: operation managers (n=6), clinical managers (n=5), 
ward managers (responsible of post-operative care) (n=3), surgery coordinators (n=3), a 
quality manager (n=1) and a research manager (n=1). The clinical managers were all 
orthopedic surgeons in managing positions, responsible for certain aspects of the elective care 
flow and for leading others. However, not all of them held a formal managerial position. The 
participants were professionally trained as orthopedic surgeons (n=12), nurses (n=6) and an 
assistant nurse (n=1) and all had extensive clinical experience. All interviews (n=19) were 
included in Study I, exploring the consequences of the patient choice reform. Two interviews 
were excluded from Study II because the participants did not to hold a managerial function 
and therefore had little experience managing other staff members through the patient choice 
model. Thus, Study II included 17 interviews.  
 
6.4.4 Data analysis 
6.4.4.1 Thematic analysis 
A thematic qualitative analysis was used to analyze interview data in Studies I and II. 
Thematic analysis has been defined as identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) 
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within qualitative data and aims to provide a rich and nuanced description of the phenomena 
of interest. In a thematic analysis the researcher is seen as an active participant giving 
meaning to data by identifying themes, which makes the researchers’ interpretations an 
essential part of the analytical process. This requires a reflexive dialogue embedded in the 
research process making researchers preconceptions and assumptions as explicit as possible 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Acknowledging the latent meaning of data has been described as a 
central characteristic of thematic analysis, which stands in contrast to e.g. content analysis, in 
which the manifest meaning and formal descriptions commonly are the main focal points 
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013). Thematic analysis is further described as a flexible 
method that allows for both inductive and deductive approaches, and different perspectives 
on epistemology (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A thematic approach was found appropriate in 
Studies I and II being a flexible method, leaving room for adaption and interpretation in 
relation to the exploratory nature of the studies. In addition, a thematic approach left room for 
interpretations of the latent meaning (rather than the manifest), when little was known prior to 
the studies about how participants would describe their experiences.  
A hypo-deductive approach (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2008) was chosen for the analysis, 
combining initial deductive coding followed by inductive coding of data assigned to the 
(broad) deductive codes. A hybrid approach has been described as useful to organize data in 
meaningful ways, using deductive coding anchored in theory to facilitate a subsequent data-
driven analysis. The a priori definition of codes may also help to articulate underlying 
preconceptions that would influence the analysis anyway. A hybrid approach for data 
analysis was found appropriate based on the complexity of the case and the interview data. 
The deductive analysis was seen as helpful to organize the data and make the subsequent 
inductive analysis more manageable. Since the studies focused on participants’ experiences 
of consequences and their behaviors an elemental theoretical model for behavior analysis 
(Skinner, 1963) was found appropriate to guide the deductive coding.  
6.4.4.2 Deductive coding  
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and imported into the Nvivo 10 software that was 
used for analysis. In accordance with guidelines for rigorous thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) the suggested steps of data analysis were applied, including data 
familiarization, initial coding of data, searching for themes, reviewing themes and defining 
and naming themes. Data familiarization was first obtained by the reading of the entire 
transcripts. Thereafter deductive coding followed, which was performed in an integrated 
manner for Studies I and II. Coding generally refers to the identification of data segments that 
appear relevant for the study purpose (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Based on theory (Skinner, 
1963), three broad deductive codes were defined: antecedents, such as rules, regulations and 
beliefs, governing behavior (Code 1), behaviors (Code 2) and identified consequences of 
relevance for behavior (Code 3). All codes were defined to include both external events, such 
as consequences for care provision, and internal events, such as emotional reactions. The first 
step of deductive coding was conducted by the thesis author and validated by letting a 
 40 
research colleague conduct separate deductive coding of three sampled transcripts. High 
consistency in coding (85 %) was observed when comparing the use of the predefined codes 
in relation to raw data. Remaining inconsistencies were discussed and coded in consensus.  
6.4.4.3 Inductive coding and definition of themes 
Following the deductive coding, inductive coding of data was conducted separately for 
Studies I and II by the thesis author, guided by the purposes of the studies. The inductive 
analysis for Study I included data from all predefined codes. Data assigned to Code 1 
addressed different aspects of the patient choice regulations governing provider behavior, but 
also other demands arising from care provision. Data assigned to Code 2 included a variety of 
behaviors, including the participants’ behaviors, but also behaviors observed in the 
organization. Data assigned to Code 3 addressed a broad variety of observed consequences. 
For Study I most relevant data were found in Code 3. Additional inductive codes were 
identified, which were clustered into themes based on the type of consequences and 
stakeholder perspective that were described. Also, data assigned to Code 1 and 2 made 
important contributions to the understanding of the chain of events preceding the identified 
consequences.  
For Study II, the inductive analysis mainly focused on data assigned to Code 2 (behaviors) 
specifically targeting managerial behaviors. However, data assigned to Code 1 and 3 were 
explored, and provided important contextual information clarifying the reasons behind the 
use of specific strategies. Inductive codes were derived from data based on the participants’ 
reports of what they did. Thereafter, the inductive codes were clustered into themes 
representing more general managerial strategies.  
The inductive coding and searching for themes in Studies I and II is best described as an 
iterative process, in which codes and themes were developed and reviewed several times. The 
final themes was named and summarized in writing by the thesis author and presented to 
research colleagues, who had independently read selected transcripts (n=6 for Study I, n= 3 
for Study II). The accuracy of coding and the identified themes were discussed in relation to 
raw data. Relevant refinements were made by consensus. 
 
6.5 EMPIRICAL CASE 2 – ANNUAL BUDGETS AT A UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL  
Studies III and IV were conducted in a public university setting responsible for care provision 
in one of the largest urban areas in Sweden. The hospital is reimbursed through annual 
budgets, the extent to which is determined at regional level. However, the distribution of 
resources to departments and units within the hospital is done by the top-management team, 
in dialogue with division- and department managers. The hospital has historically used DRG-
based reimbursement. Although DRG is still used for monitoring purposes reimbursement to 
departments and units is currently not linked to specific targets or objects. The financial 
  41 
situations has been strained for years, and at the time of the studies the hospital faced 
substantial economic constraints and cost reductions were required of all departments.  
Studies III and IV specifically involve the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, 
responsible for treatment and rehabilitation of patients with medical conditions such as brain- 
and spinal injury and stroke. Care provided at the department typically succeeds the more 
acute phase and may include both inpatient and outpatient treatment focusing on functional 
assessment and rehabilitation. The patient group is characterized by having serious and 
complex conditions and many will have lifelong needs of both health- and social care 
support. Care delivery is organized in four clinical units, primarily based on patient group 
characteristics. One of the units is integrated in the Department of Neurology, supporting the 
acute care flow. The units are staffed with professionals holding a broad range of expertise, 
such as physiotherapists, occupational therapists, physicians, psychologists, speech therapists, 
social workers, nurses and assistant nurses. Staff members are organized in interdisciplinary 
teams to support the complex needs of their patients. The quality of services is supported by 
local quality evaluation and improvement activities in compliance with international 
standards for best practice and quality in medical rehabilitation (CARF).  
The case holds relevance to the thesis by representing a common form of economic 
governance of specialized care applied in a hospital setting. The current economic constraints 
represent the general challenge of limited resources in health care, leaving top hospital 
management to decide how to handle a limited budget. With reference to the thesis aim, the 
economic governance model of Case 2 can be assumed to create a general pressure for 
departments (and thereby for professionals) to increase the overall economic efficiency of 
services.  
 
6.6 DESCRIPTION OF METHODS – STUDY III 
6.6.1 Self-assessment scales 
Across the social sciences, the idea of using questionnaires to capture subjective experiences 
such as beliefs or emotions in quantitative figures is well established. However, constructing 
measures of subjective experiences poses many challenges in regard to how questions are 
formulated, how response types are defined, and what methods that are chosen for analysis 
(Furr, 2013). The self-assessment scale is a frequently used type of measure, in which items 
are formulated as statements rather than questions, and individuals are asked to assess their 
level of agreement using a multiple-step Likert scale. Thus, self-assessment scales capture 
variation in intensity of the underlying construct. Multiple items (that are summarized into a 
scale index) are commonly used to measure the underlying construct, to reduce the risk that 
misinterpretations of a specific item influence the result too much (Spector, 1992). Scales can 
be uni or multidimensional and include items representing one or several underlying 
constructs. In the literature on self-assessment scales, the underlying constructs are also 
referred to as “factors” (and sub-factors), a term that will be used subsequently in the thesis. 
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Developing reliable and valid scales requires a rigorous development process and 
psychometric evaluation of item response patterns, based on empirical data from real life 
settings (Hinkin, 1998; Spector, 1992). Reliability of a scale generally refers to the precision 
of scores, i.e. how accurate a certain score reflects the underlying construct of interest. 
Validity of a scale generally refers to the accuracy of the definition of the underlying 
construct. Thus, a scale can be highly reliable (i.e. an accurate indicator) of something, but 
still invalid if interpreted to represent something it is not (Furr, 2013).  
 
6.6.2 Study design  
The aim of Study III was to develop and pilot-test a self-assessment scale capturing staff 
experience of governance. Acknowledging the complexity of the governance concept (Lynn, 
Heinrich, & Hill, 2000; Saltman & Duran, 2016), general definitions of economic and quality 
governance were chosen within the scope of the study, referring to the experience of 
economic efficiency and quality requirements of health care, as perceived by professional 
staff. Since these definitions distinguish between two governance objectives they were 
handled as separate subscales (A and B) including specific experiences (sub-factors) at the 
individual level, such as perceptions and emotions. The scale development process 
(illustrated in Figure 4) was guided by the recommendations provided by Hinkin (1998). A 
broad perspective on governance was applied throughout the development phase and 
included perspectives from multiple health care settings and professional groups. Thereafter, 
pilot-data were collected to enable psychometric assessment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: An illustrative overview of scale development process.  
 
Literature search for relevant 
staff experiences 
Explorative interviews n=7  
Compilation of staff experiences to                                 
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Relevant sub-factors identified and applied                     
to Subscale A and B 
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sub-factors and                         
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A tentative structural model of sub-factors                     
for Subscale A and B 
Inductive item generation  
Item revision 
First version of scale:                                                    
Subscale A: 5 sub-factors + single item= tot 26 items 
Subscale B: 3 sub-factors + single item= tot 15 items 
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6.6.3 Scale development process  
6.6.3.1 Literature search  
Literature searches were conducted to explore relevant studies using questionnaires/surveys 
to capture staff perspectives on economic efficiency and quality governance. Data bases such 
as Web of Science, Scopus and Google Scholar were used. Key words such as “self-
assessment-scale”, “survey”, and “measure” were used in combination with key terms such as 
“economic governance, “economic incentives, “reimbursement model” (for subscale A) and 
“quality governance” and “quality evaluation” (for Subscale B). Three self-assessment scales 
that capture professionals’ experiences of economic incentive models in provider 
organizations were identified (Meterko et al., 2006; Roland, Campbell, Bailey, Whalley, & 
Sibbald, 2006; Young, Beckman, & Baker, 2012). Additional searches were made to identify 
qualitative studies exploring staff experiences of specific economic governance models 
(Campbell et al., 2008; Hackett et al., 2014; McDonald et al., 2007). No studies were 
identified that specifically addressed governance of quality. However, studies using self-
assessment scales capturing staff experiences of quality improvement initiatives were found, 
(Berlowitz et al., 2003; Shortell et al., 1995) including relevant experiences of quality 
evaluation. Based on the identified studies a synthesized compilation of relevant staff 
experiences were assembled.  
6.6.3.2 Interviews to explore identified sub-factors  
Interviews were conducted with health care professionals from multiple settings to explore 
the appropriateness of using the identified experiences as sub-factors in the scale. Participants 
were recruited through the national professional associations. Two physicians, one nurse and 
one midwife volunteered. To include a local provider perspective, one manager and one nurse 
from a primary care facility were recruited. In addition, two civil servants experienced in 
issues of health care governance were recruited at the regional level. In total, seven interviews 
were conducted by the thesis author in 2017 (April to June). The interviews lasted 45-60 
minutes and were conducted face-to-face (n=5) or over the phone (n=2). The regional 
representatives were interviewed together for practical reasons. All study participants were 
informed about the study aim and written informed consent was obtained.  
All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. Nvivo 10 was used to 
analyze data. A deductive thematic analysis was conducted, following the recommended 
steps by Braun and Clarke (2006), that included the initial reading of the entire transcripts. 
The experiences identified in the literature were used as pre-defined codes, to which relevant 
data were assigned. Thereafter data assigned to the predefined codes were reviewed. The 
experiences that participants found relevant and could easily relate to were selected to be used 
as sub-factors for Subscale A and B. Three sub-factors were found applicable for both 
subscales: knowledge and understanding, opportunity to influence and motivation. Two 
additional sub-factors, identified in studies of economic governance, were found applicable 
for Subscale A only: impact on professional autonomy and organizational alignment.  
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The sub-factors were reviewed in relation to the COM-B model (Michie et al., 2011) to 
assess their theoretical relevance for behavior change. The sub-factors knowledge and 
understanding, opportunity to influence and motivation corresponded well with the 
theoretical model. A tentative structural model for all sub-factors was created for Subscale A 
and B respectively. The tentative models, including sub-factor definitions and examples from 
the literature search and interviews, are provided in the scientific manuscript (Korlén, Amer-
Wåhlin, Lindgren, & von Thiele Schwarz, 2018). 
6.6.3.3 Item development  
Items were developed for all sub-factors. An inductive item development strategy was used, 
as recommended when the access to similar scales is scarce (Rattray & Jones, 2007). An 
extensive item pool was generated, inspired by the interview data and the literature. Items 
were developed iteratively in collaboration with research colleagues. Items were formulated 
as statements and the well-established 5-point Likert scale was chosen, ranging from 
disagreement (1) to total agreement (5). Four to six items were developed for each sub-factor, 
to enable exclusion of low quality items. Aware of the observed pros’ and cons’ (Furr, 2013) 
of reversed items, at least one reversed item was developed for each sub-factor. Items were 
pilot-tested in collaboration with two clinical psychologists and one physician, who received 
a tentative survey by email and provided feedback in writing (n=1) and face to face (n=2). 
The finalized survey consisted of 25 items (in five sub-factors) for subscale A, and 15 items 
(in three sub-factors) for subscale B. To enable assessment of criterion-related validity of sub-
factors, a single item measuring impact on clinical behavior was developed for subscale A 
and B respectively. 
 
6.6.4 Data collection  
A pilot-testing of the scale was conducted and included all staff members employed at the 
department of Rehabilitation Medicine at the public university hospital described in Case 2. 
Two additional departments at the hospital were invited to the study but declined 
participation because of internal reorganization and extensive workload. 
6.6.4.1 Cognitive interviewing  
Before the survey was distributed, cognitive interviews were conducted with unit managers 
(n=2) and staff members (n=2). Cognitive interviewing is a comprehensive method to explore 
the survey response process, to get information about how the questions are perceived and 
interpreted by the respondent (Drennan, 2003). Retrospective interviewing was applied and 
participants were asked to describe their interpretation of items after filling out the survey 
independently. Items and words that the researchers found particularly challenging were also 
explored using direct questions (Willis, 2004). Talk aloud reports were summarized all 
interviews. Minor revisions of the survey and the introductory text were made to increase 
comprehension.  
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6.6.4.2 Procedures for survey distribution  
The survey was distributed in paper format to all staff members (N=183), including an 
introductory text that informed about the study aim and that participation was voluntary, and 
anonymous. The text further stated that the return of a filled in survey implied an informed 
consent to participate in the study. Additional information about the study was given by the 
unit managers in staff meetings. In addition, the thesis author arranged a meeting on site to 
inform about the study, which was filmed and made available to all staff members through 
the intranet. Completed surveys were returned to the unit managers in sealed envelopes and 
stored temporarily until collected by the thesis author. The data collection period was set in 
November and December 2017. Two remainders were sent out by email and given orally in 
staff meetings by the unit managers.  
 
6.6.5 Study participants  
93 staff members participated in the study, representing a response rate of 51 %. Missing data 
on item level were low (<2.2 %). Two participants were excluded, based on large proportions 
of missing data, resulting in a study sample of n=91. The study participant characteristics are 
presented in Table 2. All units and professional groups at the departments were fairly 
represented in the study sample. 
 
Table 2. Study participant characteristics Study III (n=91). 
  n= % 
Gender  Women  76 84  
 Men 13 14   
 Other  1 1  
 Missing 1 1  
Professional role Occupational therapist 10 11  
 Social worker 6 7  
 Speech therapist 3 3  
 Physician 4 4  
 Psychologist 8 9  
 Nurse 8 9  
 Assistant nurse 22 24  
 Physiotherapists and other 29 32  
 Missing 1 1  
  Mean  SD 
Age Years 43.7  12.4 
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6.6.6 Data analysis  
SPSS 25 was used for all data analysis and the guidelines provided by Furr (2013) and Hinkin 
(1998) were used for the psychometric assessment. The dimensionality of the scale was 
explored using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), because the sub-factors were primarily 
derived from empirical studies (rather than theory). In accordance with specific EFA 
guidelines (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; 
Williams, Onsman, & Brown, 2010), a common factor model (Principal Axis Factoring; 
PAF) was used, and oblique rotation (direct oblim) was applied since the sub-factors were 
expected to be associated. Suitability of data was checked using inter-item correlations, 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTS), and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy. The number of factors was determined based on The Kaiser criteria of eigenvalues 
>1, a visual inspection of the scree plot, the total variance explained (>60% as criteria), the 
communalities (preferably >.6) (Hinkin, 1998), as well as a qualitative judgement of factors 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005). 
At item level, the pattern matrix was inspected and factor loadings >.3 on to a factor was used 
as inclusion criteria, if not suffering from cross-loadings >.3. Cross-loading items were 
accepted if factor loadings were >.4 in the assigned factor and twice as strong as factor 
loadings in other factors (Hinkin, 1998). Cronbachs alpha was used to assess the internal 
consistency (reliability) of items assigned to a factor (>.7 as criteria). The inter-factor 
relationships of sub-factors were assessed using a correlation matrix of sub-factor indices. 
Criterion-related validity was assessed by calculating multiple regression models (Ordinary 
Least Squares Regression) for both subscales separately, using the sub-factors as predictors 
and the single item impact on clinical behavior as criterion (dependent) variable.  
 
6.7 DESCRIPTION OF METHODS – STUDY IV 
6.7.1 Study design  
Study IV was designed to explore the survey data collected in Study III further, with a 
specific focus on the experiences (sub-factors) included subscale A. Although Study III 
provided arguments for the validity of the scale, the fact that data were collected in one 
setting only and the scarcity of similar studies implied uncertainties in regard to how data 
should be interpreted. Therefore, Study IV was designed as a mixed method study, using a 
sequential explanatory design (illustrated in Figure 5) with the purpose of collecting 
qualitative data to increase the understanding of the quantitative data (Creswell & Clark, 
2007).  
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Figure 5. Illustration of the steps of the sequential explanatory design. 
 
6.7.2 Quantitative data collection and analysis  
The procedures for the collection of quantitative survey data have previously been described 
in section 6.6.4 (Study III). The study participants characteristics (n=91) have been described 
in section 6.6.5 (Study III).  
The quantitative data analysis for Study IV included data for subscale A only, using 
descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviations, and Pearson’s correlations. SPSS 25 
was used for all analyses.  
 
6.7.3 Qualitative data collection and analysis 
6.7.3.1 Focus group interviews  
After the quantitative phase was completed, additional qualitative data were collected by 
conducting focus group interviews with staff members. A purposeful sampling strategy was 
applied (Teddlie & Yu, 2007), and study participants were recruited from the same 
population of staff members who had previously been invited to answer the survey. The 
sampling strategy aimed at a broad representation of units and professional groups among the 
participants. A focus group format (Kitzinger, 1995) was chosen for the interviews, to enable 
multiple perspectives to be explored. The interaction between participants was also assumed 
to energize and spark the discussions. Assuming that some familiarity of participants would 
facilitate the dialogue, focus groups were set up to include staff members working at the same 
unit. The unit managers supported the recruitment process by reaching out to staff members 
of different professional backgrounds for volunteers. The unit managers were provided with a 
written text to share during the recruitment process, which informed about the overall study 
aim, the purpose of the focus group interviews, and about participation being voluntary. 
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Information was also provided at the time of the interviews and participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants.  
To focus the interviews on information that could support the interpretation of survey data, a 
semi-structured interview guide (provided in Appendix B) was designed to correspond with 
the domains (sub-factors) of Subscale A and the single item. An illustration of the survey 
results on group level was compiled for each sub-factor, which was shown to the participants 
as an introduction to the discussion of each domain. The presentation of data was followed by 
openly formulated questions such as “What are your thoughts on these results?”. The 
participants were encouraged to elaborate their reasoning on the matter by the use of follow-
up questions. All interviews were conducted face-to-face by the thesis author in 2018 (April 
to August) on the provider site. The interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes and all 
interviews were digitally recorded. 
6.7.3.2 Study participants  
In total, three focus group interviews were conducted, including ten participants representing 
two of the clinical units and a majority of professional groups. Both men and women were 
represented and the participants’ experience of working at the units varied. Study participant 
characteristics are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Study participant characteristics. 
  
Focus group 1 
n = 3 
Focus group 2 
n = 3 
Focus group 3 
n = 4 
Unit  Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 3 
Gender  Women 3 2 2 
 Men   1 2 
Professional role Occupational therapist  1 1 
 Physician   1 
 Psychologist   1 
 Nurse  1  
 Assistant nurse 2   
 Physiotherapists   1 1 
 Administrative staff 1   
Time of employment >5 years 2 3 1 
 <5 years 1  3 
 
6.7.3.3 Data analysis 
The interview recordings were transcribed verbatim by the thesis author, and Nvivo 10 was 
used to analyze data. To familiarize with data the transcripts were read multiple times. 
Thereafter a deductive thematic analysis was conducted (Braun & Clarke, 2006) by the thesis 
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author, using the sub-factors of the scale as basis for the code-book. After the deductive 
coding was completed, data assigned to the predefined codes were carefully reviewed and 
appeared to include rich data, which covered multiple aspects of the phenomena. Therefore, 
an inductive analysis of the data assigned to each of the predefined codes was found 
necessary. Additional inductive codes were identified and clustered into themes, guided by 
the study aim. A tentative analysis was summarized by the thesis author, which was 
developed in collaboration with research colleagues. This was done in a one-day workshop 
format, which included the prior reading of all interview transcripts for all participants. The 
accuracy of the deductive coding and the relevance of the inductively derived codes and 
themes were discussed until consensus was reached.  
 
6.7.4 Mixing methods 
The last step of analysis consisted of mixing the qualitative and quantitative findings. This 
was made by the thesis author and research colleagues in a two-day-collaborative workshop 
format. The data integration primarily focused on how the qualitative data enhanced the 
understanding of the quantitative findings (Bryman, 2006), and was conducted for one sub-
factor at a time. Substantial attention was also given to how the qualitative data and the 
inductive themes contributed to the overall understanding of staff experiences of economic 
efficiency requirements, beyond the specific focus of the scale items.  
 
6.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Principles for ethical standards and good research practice have guided the empirical studies 
included in the thesis. Specific ethical considerations will be presented in accordance with the 
principles of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2019). 
 
6.8.1 Research ethics committee  
All studies included in the thesis have been reviewed and approved by the Regional Ethical 
Review Board at Karolinska Institutet in Stockholm (reference 2014/765–31/5). 
 
6.8.2 Risk, burdens and benefits 
Assessments of the potential risk of harm to study participants were made prior to all studies 
and reflected upon continuously throughout the thesis project. Although it was emphasized 
throughout the recruitment process that participation was voluntary, there was a risk that 
study participants felt obliged to take part, in particular since the recruitment was made in 
collaboration with their managers. To minimize this risk, the voluntary participation and the 
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opportunity to withdraw participation at any time was emphasized when communicating with 
volunteering participants. There was also a risk that participants would feel forced to share 
certain experiences or opinions, or to be more open than they would be comfortable with. The 
research topic explored in the thesis is not obviously private or personal, but could evoke 
discussions that might be distressful in a way that the participants could not foresee. Attention 
was payed to these aspects during interviews and participants were occasionally reminded of 
their right to refrain from discussing certain questions.  
 
6.8.3 Informed consent  
Written informed consent was obtained from all study participants who volunteered for 
interviews. Information about the study was provided to participants prior to interviews and 
during the interview session. For the survey study, information about the study and conditions 
for participation was provided on the introductory page, and it was explicitly stated that the 
return of a filled out survey implied informed consent to participate.  
 
6.8.4 Privacy and confidentiality  
Although the recruitment of study participants for interviews was made in dialogue with 
managers, efforts were made to establish individual contacts with participants and to be 
discrete about the booking of interviews. Although participation in the survey study was 
anonymous, the surveys included demographic data and were identifiable at unit level. 
Survey data have been handled confidentially and have been accessible for the researchers 
only. Safe handling and storage of data have been made in accordance with general 
guidelines of good research practice and in compliance with local policies of research 
documentation at Karolinska Institutet. Qualitative data (including citations) and the 
empirical setting have been carefully described not to include information that could uncover 
the identity of participants. Survey data have been presented at group level only 
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7 FINDINGS 
7.1 STUDY I  
In Study I professionals’ perspectives on the consequences of the patient choice model were 
explored. Although the aim was not primarily to compare experiences across provider types, 
it is worth mentioning that the respondents’ analyses shared many similarities across 
providers. Particular differences across provider types will be described.  
 
7.1.1 Multiple stakeholder perspectives  
The respondents spontaneously took the perspectives of multiple system levels when 
reflecting upon consequences of the patient choice reform, including the perspective of the 
provider organization but also of the regional health care system as a whole. Further, their 
analysis ranged from short- to long-term consequences.  
 
7.1.2 Multiple types of consequences 
The findings showed that respondents identified multiple types of consequences (illustrated in 
Figure 6), and observations at the provider and the system-level were described.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. An overview of the consequences of the patient choice model. 
Provider level 
System level 
For the organization 
of care 
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environment 
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7.1.2.1 For the organization of care  
In response to the patient choice model efforts had been made across providers to use 
resources more efficiently, for example by standardizing the care flow and optimizing the 
scheduling of operating theatres. In addition, strategies to improve the quality of care, for 
example by reducing the risk of infections, had been implemented. Although the general level 
of reimbursement was considered low, the bundle payment was perceived as a positive 
principle since it allowed clinical expertise (rather than reimbursement logics) to guide the 
design of the care flow. The infection guarantee was perceived as reasonable, although the 
risk of post-operative infections was regarded to be partly outside of the providers’ control.  
The consequences for the organization of care were also analyzed taking a broader system 
perspective that followed the entire patient pathway. Experiences of incomplete assessments 
in primary care were described as a limitation of the current model for organizing care, which 
contributed to inefficiency at system level when referrals had to be rejected. In addition, 
potential gains of integrating post-operative rehabilitation into the model were proposed.   
7.1.2.2 For patients  
Respondents also analyzed the consequences of the patient choice model from a patient 
perspective. Seen from a provider perspective, the waiting times had been substantially 
reduced for patients awaiting surgery. However, respondents identified limitations in the use 
of the ASA-assessment as inclusion criteria, since patients who had more extensive care 
needs (e.g. old aged) were occasionally classified as low-risk patients, who were required to 
go through the relatively fast-paced care flow.   
Taking a system perspective, respondents identified the risk of fragmentation of care for 
patients, since the entire patient journey involved several provider types. This in turn, 
required patients to be resourceful enough to manage the care process and make active 
choices. Respondents raised concerns that the choice model put vulnerable patients at risk.  
7.1.2.3 For the work environment  
The respondents described the structural organization of care in the patient choice model to 
influence their work environment, although this was described differently across provider 
types. For respondents in hospitals, the proportion of high-risk patients suffering from 
complex conditions had increased, which resulted in a more demanding work environment. 
At specialized providers, the homogenous (low-risk) patient population was described to 
provide opportunities to become highly skilled in handling specific conditions. However, the 
uniformity of tasks was regarded as a risk factor for reducing job satisfaction. Respondents 
across provider types described a mixed patient population to be desirable from a work 
environment perspective, and incentives to support provider collaboration were proposed.  
Taking a system perspective, the respondents raised concerns regarding the dichotomized 
working conditions across provider types. In their view, it could contribute to dividing the 
professional community into sub-groups and negatively influence competence development.  
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7.1.2.4 For educational activities 
The structural organization of care in the patient choice model was described to influence 
educational activities at the hospitals. By diminishing the proportion of low-risk patients, the 
learning opportunities for physicians undergoing specialist training had decreased. Since the 
reimbursement was fixed regardless of the orthopedic surgeon’s competence level (and 
operation rate), the involvement of junior physicians was also economically costly for the 
hospital providers. Respondents called for revisions to better align the economic incentives to 
the educational system and to support increased provider collaboration.  
The misalignment of the patient choice model and the structures for education was also 
reflected upon taking a system perspective, and concerns for the assurance of medical 
expertise over time were expressed.  
7.1.2.5 For research  
Respondents at hospital providers also expressed concerns about the diminishing population 
of low-risk patients, in regard that this undermined the opportunities for clinical research. 
Respondents at specialized providers made similar observations, pointing at the pity of not 
engaging their patients in research studies.  
Respondents also reflected upon the implications for research activities taking a broader 
system perspective and concerns were expressed in regard to the development of scientific 
knowledge over time.  
 
7.2 STUDY II  
In Study II, several managerial strategies were identified (illustrated in Figure 7), reconciling 
external demands to staff preferences. This confirms the role of managers as intermediaries 
between the patient choice model and staff. The managerial strategies appeared to be 
anchored in the respondents’ contextual knowledge about the practical implications of the 
patient choice model and their understanding of staffs’ motivational preferences.  
 
7.2.1 Explaining the logic of the patient choice model 
The respondents tried to increase staff awareness of the requirements derived from the patient 
choice model, by explaining its practical implications. Efforts were also made to provide a 
rationale for necessary change processes. In addition, respondents tried to make staff 
members understand the choice model in relation to the overall assignment at provider level 
and in relation to the roles of other stakeholders in the regional health care system.  
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7.2.2 Translating the model 
The respondents made attempts to translate the economic logics of the patient choice model 
into targets that were more strongly linked to patient value and quality outcomes, since this 
was central to staff motivation. Efforts to make the care flow more efficient were framed as 
improvement initiatives, and respondents experienced that they concurrently had to assure 
staff that quality would come first. Respondents refrained from using economic figures or 
talking in terms of profit when communicating with staff, to avoid the risk of being perceived 
as unaware of professional values. Economic figures were also considered to be too loosely 
linked to what staff could control, and therefore less appropriate as a motivational tool. 
Although respondents described that maintaining focus on patients was an important aspect 
of leadership, it was also emphasized that staff members were concerned with resources 
being sensibly and fairly used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Illustration of managerial alignment strategies. 
7.2.3 Operationalizing the model 
The respondents described that they operationalized the patient choice model by defining 
concrete and feasible tasks for staff, in accordance with the imposed requirements. This 
clarified the expectations on staff members and created opportunities for feedback, which was 
considered as an important motivational tool. The respondents emphasized the importance of 
monitoring staff behaviors to be able to provide credible and useful feedback. Data on 
provider performance, such as patient satisfaction and patient outcomes, were described as 
important to inform the feedback process.  
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7.2.4 Personalizing rewards 
The respondents highlighted the importance of personalizing rewards in accordance with 
individual preferences to increase staff motivation. Although there was no direct link between 
reimbursement at the provider level and individual payment for staff, one private provider 
had introduced a team-based bonus if complication costs were kept low. Although the 
respondents acknowledged that financial reward through increased salary could be motivating 
for some individuals, the general experience was that non-monetary rewards, such as time 
assigned for competence development or research engagements, were highly valued.   
 
7.2.5 Overruling the model 
At rare occasions, the respondents found themselves obliged to overrule the financial logic of 
the model to meet patient needs, on the expense of the provider organization. The primary 
reason for this was limitations in the inclusion criteria, which could include vulnerable 
patients in the patient choice model although they were in need of more extensive post-
surgery care. Respondents described the reasons for overruling to be related to their own 
ethical conviction, but also to the well-being and motivation of staff sharing similar 
professional values.  
 
7.2.6 Improving the model 
Respondents expressed a will to engage in a closer dialogue with policy makers, to improve 
the patient choice model and make it more aligned with patient needs. Although there was 
occasional contact between the provider organizations and representatives at regional level, 
respondents called for a more formalized forum for feedback and dialogue to enable policy 
improvement. The respondents also believed that collaboration and trust between 
professionals and decision makers could contribute to the design of future choice models. 
 
7.3 STUDY III  
7.3.1 Exploring dimensionality and items 
In the initial screening, two items did not meet the inter-item correlation criteria of >.3 and 
were excluded from the factor analysis. The general suitability of data was confirmed by a 
significant BTS (p<.001) and a KMO index >.5 (.67). An EFA was conducted (PAF, direct 
oblim rotation), which showed an initial nine factor solution. Based on a qualitative 
judgment, the ninth factor was not found to make a meaningful contribution. Therefore, three 
items that loaded strongly in the ninth factor, neither contributing substantially to any other 
factor, were dropped. An EFA was conducted based on the remaining items, which showed a 
satisfactory eight factor solution fulfilling the criteria of eigenvalues >1 and explaining 71.8% 
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of variance in data. A visual inspection of the scree plot confirmed the factor structure and a 
majority of items (78 %) showed strong communalities (>.5).  
All items showed factor loadings >.3 and were assigned to a factor. The majority of items did 
not show problematic cross-loads exceeding >.3. However, for three items cross-loads (>.3) 
were observed, but based on our qualitative assessment of the content, the less problematic 
nature of cross-loads and the expected association of factors, the items were kept. Items were 
assigned to the factor associated with the stronger factor loading. The items 6 and 32 loaded 
on to other factors than expected, but were found relevant for the designated factors. All 
factors met the Cronbach’s alpha criteria for internal consistency, except impact on 
professional autonomy. In consideration of this being a recently developed scale and to 
provide opportunities for improvement, the factor and items were retained. The single item of 
subscale A showed cross-loadings (>.3) in two factors, indicating its independence from other 
factors. The single item of Subscale B loaded in one factor only (>.3), but considering the 
expected relationship between factors and behavior change the single item was kept for 
assessment of criterion-related validity.  
The final scale is presented in Table 4, including mean, SD, Cronbach’s alpha values and 
factor loadings in assigned factors. Single items are included in the table. The final scale 
contains two subscales, including five sub-factors represented by 21 items in subscale A, and 
three sub-factors represented by 14 items in subscale B. The scale was named “The staff 
experience of governance of economic efficiency and quality (GOV-EQ) scale”. A Swedish 
version of items included in the final scale is provided in Appendix C. 
Table 4. Final scale including items, mean, SD, Cronbach’s alpha and factor loadings. 
Sub-factors and items 
(of Subscale A & B) 
Cr 
Alpha 
Mean 
(SD) 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 
Knowledge and awareness 
(A) 
0.86 
2.99 
(.91) 
        
1.I know how I should take 
the unit’s financial situation 
into consideration in my 
work. 
 
3.26 
(1.19) 
     -.802   
2. I know what I can do to 
make the unit’s financial 
situation as good as possible. 
 
3.09 
(1.17) 
     -.809   
3. I know how to deal 
responsibly with the unit’s 
financial resources.  
 
3.26 
(1.18) 
     -.711   
4. I know how to plan my 
work to ensure that we stay 
within the unit’s budget. 
 
2.58 
(1.21) 
     -.786   
5. I find it difficult to see how I 
can influence the unit’s 
financial situation (R). 
 
2.54 
(1.30) 
     -.500   
6. I am aware of the unit’s 
financial situation when I 
make decisions in my work 
with patients. 
 
3.22 
(1.06) 
     -.326   
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Opportunity to influence 
(A) 
0.89 
1.97 
(.95) 
        
7. I get involved in 
discussions concerning the 
unit’s financial situation. 
 
2.07 
(1.12) 
   -.795     
8. I can influence how the 
financial resources are used 
in the unit. 
 
1.77 
(1.07) 
   -.925     
9. I am able to express my 
opinions on how we can use 
the unit’s resources more 
efficiently. 
 
2.37 
(1.09) 
   -.728     
10. My opinions matter when 
budgetary decisions are 
made. 
 
1.72 
(1.07) 
   -.838     
Motivation (A) 0.83 
3.08 
(1.01) 
        
11. It’s motivating to work 
with issues that concern the 
unit’s financial situation. 
 
2.54 
(1.19) 
    .822    
12. It’s fulfilling to try to 
improve the unit’s financial 
situation. 
 
3.51 
(1.18) 
    .803    
13. I am interested in the 
unit’s financial situation. 
 
3.22 
(1.16) 
    .693    
Impact on professional 
autonomy (A) 
0.62 
3.31 
(.92) 
        
14. The unit’s financial status 
affects my ability to do what 
is best for patients. 
 
3.53 
(1.19) 
 
      .499  
15. The unit’s financial 
limitations affect my ability to 
adhere to my own ethical 
values. 
 
2.97 
(1.26) 
      .638  
16. I feel free to do what is 
best for the patient, 
regardless of the unit’s 
financial situation (R). 
 
3.44 
(1.21) 
      .315  
Organizational alignment 
(A) 
0.87 
2.29 
(.84) 
        
17. I think the unit’s financial 
resources are reasonable. 
 
2.27 
(.99) 
 .830       
18. We have the financial 
resources needed to meet 
patient needs. 
 
2.26 
(1.07) 
 .831       
19. I think the unit’s financial 
situation is sustainable. 
 
2.19 
(.91) 
 .906       
20. The unit’s financial status 
is sufficient to allow us to 
fulfill our mission. 
 
2.30 
(1.01) 
 .739       
21. The financial 
requirements placed on the 
unit negatively impact our 
patients. (R) 
 
2.36 
(1.16) 
 
 .568       
Single item: Impact on 
clinical behavior (A) 
          
22. I take the unit’s financial 
situation into consideration in 
my clinical work. 
 
3.32 
(1.00) 
.342    .389    
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Knowledge and awareness 
(B) 
0.82 
4.06 
(.72) 
        
23. I know what leads to 
good quality care for our 
patients. 
 
4.09 
(.88) 
.637        
24. I know what I should do, 
in my role, to ensure that we 
maintain high levels of 
quality. 
 
4.35 
(.72) 
.821        
25. I know how I can get 
involved in quality 
improvement. 
 
3.59 
(1.14) 
.454        
26. I know how to plan my 
work to ensure that what I do 
is of good quality. 
 
4.21 
(.80) 
.877        
Opportunity to influence 
(B) 
0.89 
 
3.31 
(.91) 
        
27. I can influence how the 
unit works with quality 
improvement. 
 
3.10 
(1.17) 
  -.817      
28.I participate in the unit’s 
work with quality 
improvement. 
 
3.40 
(1.18) 
  -.687      
29. I can influence where we 
focus our improvement work. 
 
3.01 
(1.16) 
  -.933      
30. My opinions matter when 
we work with quality 
improvement. 
 
3.13 
(1.09) 
  -.834      
31. By the time we begin our 
work on quality improvement, 
it has already been decided 
how it should be carried out. 
(R) 
 
3.28 
(1.08) 
  -.622      
32. I find it difficult to see how 
I can influence quality at the 
unit. (R) 
 
3.85 
(1.07) 
 
  -.377      
Motivation (B) 0.78 
4.15 
(.69) 
        
33. Quality improvement 
work is motivating.  
 
4.11 
(.94) 
       -.762 
34. I think it is part of my role 
to get involved with quality 
improvement.  
 
4.27 
(.73) 
       -.763 
35. It’s fulfilling to try to 
improve quality at the unit. 
 
4.32 
(.92) 
       -.310 
36. I am interested in how we 
compare to other units with 
regard to quality.  
 
3.89 
(.96) 
       -.338 
Single item: Impact on 
clinical behavior (B) 
          
37. I take quality into 
consideration in my clinical 
work. 
 
4.24 
(.85) 
.561        
Notes: Factor loadings (PAF, direct oblim) for items on to assigned factors. Factor loadings <.3 are omitted from 
the table. (R) indicates that the item is reversely scored. 
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7.3.2 Inter-factor relationships 
Pearson’s correlations of sub-factor indices (presented in Table 5) showed several sub-factors 
to be moderately positively related to each other, in accordance with the tentative model. The 
associations between the sub-factors knowledge and awareness, opportunity to influence and 
motivation were however stronger in subscale B, than in subscale A. The sub-factors impact 
on professional autonomy and organizational alignment (subscale A) were moderately 
negatively correlated to each other, but not associated with any other sub-factor. The 
knowledge and awareness and motivation domains were moderately positively correlated 
with their counterpart across subscale A and B, however this did not apply for the opportunity 
to influence sub-factor.  
Table 5. Inter-factor correlations for subscale A and B, including mean and SD. 
   
M 
(SD) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
A 1. 
Knowledge 
and awareness 
2.99 
(.91) 
1        
A 2. 
Opportunity to 
influence 
1.97 
(.95) 
.398** 1       
A 3. 
Motivation 
 
3.08 
(1.01) 
.220* .215* 1      
A 4. 
Impact on prof 
autonomy 
3.31 
(.92) 
-.065 -.167 -.096 1     
A 5. 
Organizational 
alignment 
2.29 
(.84) 
.055 .187 .019 -.475** 1    
B 6. 
Knowledge 
and awareness 
4.06 
(.72) 
.452** .152 .081 -.091 -.152 1   
B 7. 
Opportunity to 
influence  
3.31 
(.91) 
.094 .214* .278** -.256* .114 .278** 1  
B 8. Motivation  
4.15 
(.69) 
.129 .051 .415** .070 -.174 .450** .474** 1 
Notes: Pearson correlation, *p< .05, ** p< .01 (2-tailed). 
 
7.3.3 Criterion-related validity 
The multiple regression model for Subscale A (df (5, 79) = F 9.24, p<.001) showed that the 
sub-factors knowledge and awareness (beta coefficient .394, p<.001) and motivation (beta 
coefficient .310, p<.001) contributed significantly to the prediction of the criterion 
(dependent) variable impact on clinical behavior, explaining 37 % of the variance.  
Similarly, the multiple regression model for Subscale B (df (3, 84) =F 18.47, p<.001) showed 
that the sub-factors knowledge and awareness (beta coefficient .417, p<.001) and motivation 
(beta .318, p<.001) contributed significantly to predict the criterion (dependent) variable 
impact on clinical behavior, explaining 40 % of the variance. The remaining sub-factors did 
not contribute significantly to the models.  
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7.4 STUDY IV  
The findings from Study IV are presented in accordance with the sub-factor structure of 
Subscale A in the GOV-EQ scale, along with the single item. The presentation combines the 
quantitative and qualitative findings. For each domain, survey data at group level (index 
mean, SD) are presented, followed by a summary of how the qualitative data enhance the 
understanding of the quantitative data. Thereafter the qualitative analysis will be presented, 
organized according to the inductive themes. Last, findings from the data integration phase 
are described. 
 
7.4.1 Impact on clinical behavior  
The mean rating of impact on clinical behavior (single item) was 3.32, with a standard 
deviation of 0.92. In the interviews respondents described that they regularly took the unit’s 
financial situation into consideration, particularly in regard to resource utilization. Thus, the 
qualitative data support the quantitative data, suggesting that economic efficiency 
requirements generally have an impact on staff behavior.  
7.4.1.1 Multiple ways of managing resources  
According to the respondents, economic considerations influenced clinical work in multiple 
ways, for example, when purchasing equipment, pharmaceuticals and mobility aids and when 
ordering supplementary lab-test and examinations. Efforts were made to find the cheapest 
alternatives and costs were carefully considered in relation to patient benefit. Concern for the 
financial situation at the unit was also reflected in staff members’ efforts to avoid costly 
short-time recruitments and efforts were made to handle the workload with existing staff 
members. 
7.4.1.2 Data integration 
Although the quantitative data suggest that considerations of the unit’s financial situation 
impact clinical work to some extent, the qualitative data indicate that a midpoint rating rather 
reflects a substantial impact on clinical behavior. The qualitative data further show that the 
financial responsibilities may be different across professional roles, leaving room for 
individual variation.  
 
7.4.2 Knowledge and awareness 
At group level, the mean rating of perceived knowledge and awareness of economic 
efficiency requirement was 2.99 (SD 0.91). In the interviews, the respondents expressed that 
they considered themselves as well aware of economic efficiency requirements and thereby 
the qualitative data are concordant with the quantitative findings. The interview data further 
provided a more nuanced picture of staff preferences for different types of knowledge. 
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7.4.2.1 Awareness of guidelines governs behavior  
The respondents described the financial situation to be regularly discussed in staff meetings 
and in the day-to-day-interactions at the unit. The respondents seemed well aware of 
guidelines for how resources should be managed, in particular the public procurement 
regulations, and knew when to ask for advice from their managers.  
7.4.2.2 Understanding resource utilization drives engagement  
Increased knowledge of how cost and resources are distributed at the units was assumed to 
spark interest among staff, since that would make them better prepared to choose among 
alternatives. Respondents expressed that they would like to be more involved in analyses and 
discussions on resource utilization, preferably together with financially skilled staff. 
7.4.2.3  The balancing act of awareness 
Although respondents reflected upon the potential upsides of increasing staff awareness, the 
importance of not allowing economic considerations to overshadow the patient perspective 
was emphasized. To provide information that enables action and still does not undermine the 
engagement of staff was described as an important balancing act for managers. 
7.4.2.4 Knowledge beyond unit level loses meaning 
Respondents described that they regularly received information about the overall financial 
situation at the hospital. However, such information was commonly experienced as abstract 
and hard to understand and information going beyond unit level was perceived as less 
meaningful. 
7.4.2.5 Data integration 
Based on the integration of data staff members seem well aware of how to manage resources 
carefully. However, there seems to be an optimal level of knowledge and awareness as 
perceived by staff, enabling informed decisions without turning them into financial officers. 
In addition, knowledge that specifically addresses staff members’ contribution is more 
appreciated than information at system level, being outside of staff members’ control. Still, 
the staff seems to posit integrated knowledge including both a unit and a system perspective, 
which needs to be carefully considered when interpreting survey data. 
 
7.4.3 Opportunity to influence 
At group level, the mean rating of the opportunity to influence economic efficiency 
requirements was 1.97 (SD 0.95). Similarly, the interview data showed that staff experienced 
limited opportunities to influence the unit’s financial situation.  
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7.4.3.1 Constrained by counterproductive guidelines 
Although respondents described that they tried to manage resources carefully, the public 
procurement guidelines occasionally limited their ability to do so, since contracted suppliers 
could be more expensive than others in the market, or provided products that did not fit to the 
intended purpose. 
7.4.3.2 Little influence on resource allocation 
Although trying to optimize the use of resources, the respondents expressed that their 
opportunities to influence the overall resource allocation was very low. Also, unit managers 
were perceived to have little influence over the unit’s budget and staff experienced 
themselves distanced to those making the financial decisions. 
7.4.3.3 Data integration 
The integration of data reflects that staff experiences little opportunity to influence, however 
the interview data provide insights about the complexity of this domain. Staff members seem 
to distinguish their influence over resource allocation from their influence over resource 
utilization, and the low quantitative ratings seem to mainly reflect the former. Financial issues 
are generally perceived to be handled far above staff level. Although survey items clearly 
refer to influence over the financial situation at unit level, the qualitative data suggest that 
staff members integrate both the unit and the system-level perspective, which needs to be 
acknowledged when interpreting survey data.  
 
7.4.4 Motivation  
At group level, the mean rating of motivation to engage in issues of economic efficiency 
requirements was 3.08 (SD 1.01). Interview data support the notion that staff members are 
motivated to engage in the financial situation at the unit by providing examples of multiple 
reasons for staff finding it meaningful to manage resources carefully.  
7.4.4.1 Meaningful in multiple ways  
The respondents expressed multiple reasons for why an efficient use of economic resources is 
meaningful. Opportunities to use saved resources to improve care and invest in competence 
development were described, for the benefit of patients and professionals. Respondents also 
identified themselves as taxpayers, and expressed their concerns regarding publicly collected 
funds and that they should be fairly used. Thus, staff engagement in issues of economic 
efficiency seemed conditional insofar that savings should be made for the best of patients, 
staff, or the public.  
7.4.4.2 Behaviors and consequences insufficiently connected 
Respondents expressed that the connection between staff behaviors to improve economic 
efficiency and the following consequences was perceived as unclear, and at risk of 
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undermining staff engagement. Respondents assumed that an increased mandate among staff 
to decide upon how savings could be used for improvements would boost staff engagement. 
The history of financial constraints, however, may have contributed to establish expectations 
among staff that the tough economic situation at the hospital would remain, regardless of staff 
members’ efforts.  
7.4.4.3 Trust in the system  
Respondents emphasized the importance of persons at leading positions to act fairly, with a 
clear intention to do what is best from a public interest perspective. Selfish or inappropriate 
use of the system’s limited resources, through e.g. unreasonable wage levels or beneficiary 
agreements for top managers, were perceived to have demoralizing effects among staff. 
Respondents’ engagement seemed, in that sense, associated to their overall trust in the health 
care system being fair and reasonable, relying on other actors doing their part. 
7.4.4.4 Data integration   
The data integration reflects that staff members experience that the efficient use of resources 
is intrinsically motivating, for multiple reasons. Nevertheless, potential risk factors are 
identified at both unit and system level. This further highlights the importance of behavioral 
contingencies, since staff behaviors may be influenced by consequences in the local 
environment but also by their subjective assessment of system-level events, such as the 
behaviors of people in top-management positions. 
 
7.4.5 Impact on professional autonomy 
At group level, the mean rating of impact on professional autonomy was 3.31 (SD 0.92) and 
similarly the qualitative data suggested that staff experiences financial considerations to 
influence their professional autonomy to meet patient needs. Although this was described as a 
potentially harmful dilemma, respondents also expressed acceptance over resources being 
limited.  
7.4.5.1 Limitations and acceptance 
Respondents provided examples of how public procurement regulations occasionally limited 
their freedom to individualize care and that long-term follow up and preventive care may get 
a lower priority when resources are limited. Still, respondents expressed acceptance for the 
fact that resources are, and always will be, limited in health care.  
7.4.5.2 Strategies to minimize harm to professional values 
Respondents described strategies to enable actions in accordance with their professional 
ethos, which was described as a key factor for wellbeing at work. Occasionally efforts were 
made to find ways around the system, to meet the needs of specific patients.  
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7.4.5.3 Data integration 
The integration of data brings some uncertainty on how to interpret the quantitative findings 
in this domain, since limitations to the professional autonomy were mostly discussed in 
hypothetical terms. In addition, it is unclear whether ratings reflect staff experiences with or 
without strategies to mitigate a negative impact. Although this should be acknowledged when 
interpreting data, the interviews still confirm the relevance of professional autonomy for 
general job satisfaction among professional staff. 
 
7.4.6 Organizational alignment  
At group level, the mean rating of organizational alignment was 2.29 (SD 0.87), which 
indicates some imbalance between perceived economic resources and the unit’s assignment 
to meet patient needs. However, the interview data suggest that staff members also take the 
greater system’s ability to care for patients into consideration, which might be reflected in the 
ratings.  
7.4.6.1 The unit in context of the system 
The respondents expressed that the opportunities to meet patient needs are fairly good at the 
unit. However, respondents expressed concern for the overall systems’ ability to care for the 
entire patient population, including those whose referrals were rejected.  
7.4.6.2 Caring for patients across system stakeholders 
Respondents shared experiences of handling patient related issues that arise at the units’ 
interfaces, e.g. when patients are referred to primary care or to services provided by the 
municipality. Based on the patients’ serious conditions, treatment is generally costly and 
respondents described how they regularly had to fight for their patients’ rights to treatment 
and welfare services post discharge. Respondents emphasized the need for better stakeholder 
integration. 
7.4.6.3 Data integration 
Data integration clearly shows that staff experiences of balance between financial resources 
and patient needs at unit level, cannot be separated from the overall system’s ability to care 
for patients. Thus, the quantitative ratings are probably influenced by staff members’ 
experiences of imbalance across the entire care cycle, including health- and social care 
integration.  
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8 DISCUSSION 
The thesis contributes to the understanding of professionals’ experience of economic 
governance by providing insights about the complex consequences for clinical practice. The 
thesis further shows that professionals’ experience is characterized by incorporating the 
perspective of their provider organizations, as well as other stakeholders in the system, caring 
for the entire patient journey. The thesis further suggests that professionals find economic 
efficiency requirements meaningful and part of their responsibility. Moreover, the thesis 
shows that professionals generally are aware of how they should respond to such 
requirements, and it provides multiple examples of how this manifests in clinical work. 
However, economic considerations are constantly put in relation to patient needs, which are 
guided by the professional ethos, and extensive discrepancy between the two is perceived as 
potentially harmful from a work environment perspective. Thereby the thesis supports the 
relevance of aligning economic governance models to the quality and equity purposes of 
health care. The thesis further clarifies that the impact of economic governance models is not 
only present at the managerial level, but also influences professional staff. Nevertheless, the 
balancing act of not letting economic requirements overshadow the patient perspective is 
perceived to be an important aspect of managerial strategies to motivate staff, as perceived by 
staff members and professional managers themselves.  
In the following sections the thesis findings will be discussed. Thereafter, important 
methodological considerations and the overall validity of findings will be reflected upon. 
Last, implications for research and practice will be presented.  
 
8.1 THE COMPLEXITY OF CONSEQUENCES  
The thesis findings show that economic governance strategies are clearly present at the 
professional level, and managers and staff members both experience this to have an influence 
on clinical practice in a complex way.  
The thesis studies suggest that economic governance models are transformed at the provider 
level into concrete actions and guidelines for organization of care and resource use, which in 
turn are transferred to professionals to influence their clinical behaviors. The actions taken are 
of course linked to the components of specific governance models, for example, in Studies I 
and II specific strategies to improve the efficiency and quality of care are described. In Study 
IV, a more general awareness of economic constraints and resource use are reflected in 
survey ratings and in interviews. Thereby the thesis findings support the idea that economic 
governance strategies can be a means for influencing provider behavior (Barnum, Kutzin, & 
Saxenian, 1995), also when incentives do not target the individual level (Robinson, 2001). 
Although one may assume that professionals in managerial positions would be the main 
target group for such requirements, the thesis findings suggest the awareness and 
responsiveness to economic governance models goes all the way down to the staff level. 
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Although the thesis provides empirical examples of how economic governance puts focus on 
certain aspects of care delivery, the issue of whether these responses contribute to attaining 
the desired outcomes at the system level is far more complex. At this point it should be 
emphasized that the aim of this thesis is not to evaluate the outcomes of the economic 
governance models applied in the thesis studies. However, professionals’ experiences may 
provide useful insights into how the models should be evaluated and understood. A central 
characteristic of professionals’ experiences across the thesis studies is that it highlights the 
complexity of consequences that a specific model entails, identifying potentially positive and 
negative outcomes, which goes far beyond the more common focus on provider costs and 
productivity.  
In Study I, potentially positive consequences of optimizing the care flow are observed, such 
as improving resource use and reducing waiting times for patients, which is consistent with 
local evaluations of the model (Wohlin et al., 2016). The specific focus on reducing 
infections may be positive when viewed from cost, quality, and patient experience 
perspectives. However, the role of structural change in moving low risk patients out from 
hospitals seems particularly important in this case, negatively influencing current structures 
for education and research, which corroborates with the literature highlighting the changing 
conditions for university hospitals as a result of transformation in specialized care (Rechel, 
Duran, et al., 2018). In addition, there seems to be a concern for increased fragmentation of 
care and unintended consequences for vulnerable patients, which resonates with studies 
evaluating patient choice (Fotaki et al., 2008) and the application of financial incentive 
models (Roland et al., 2006) in primary care. In addition, the shift toward more homogenous 
patient populations and monotonous tasks seems to have negative implications for job strain 
and work environment for professionals, although it is rational from an efficiency 
perspective. In Study IV, professionals’ reasoning illustrates complexity in regard to how 
consequences evolve over time when trying to reduce resource use. The potential risks of 
short-sighted savings are highlighted, for example illustrated in the requirements to use 
cheaper materials at the risk of increasing infection rates and thereby increasing end costs. 
Similarly, giving lower priority to preventive interventions are described as a risk for letting 
problems grow bigger and more costly, as time goes by. Study IV also illustrates the 
complexity of resource management in big provider organizations, in which compliance with 
centrally defined guidelines might provide obstacles for acting flexibly and cost efficiently in 
the handling of individual cases.  
Based on the complexity of consequences illustrated in the thesis, it seems impossible to 
come to a simple verdict in regard to whether a specific economic governance application is 
good or bad. In that sense the thesis supports the notion that evaluation of economic 
governance strategies is complex (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Flodgren et al., 2011) and should be 
so, if paying sufficient attention to the variety of potential consequences over time. Still, the 
thesis provides arguments for using professionals, with ears and eyes on the ground, as a 
source of knowledge in evaluation studies providing insights into long-term consequences in 
a variety of domains. The thesis thereby supports the use of comprehensive data to represent 
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multiple outcome measures (linked to multiple aims) in evaluation studies. In addition, 
particular attention should be given to how common system-level functions, such as research 
and education, are influenced. The thesis further supports the relevance of improving 
evaluation study designs to include longer time spans for identifying short-term and long-
term consequences and their interrelationships. 
The empirical case of Studies I and II further shows that the structural reorganization of care 
and differences in responsibilities across provider types influence the conditions for providers 
to respond to the patient choice model. In this case, sufficient attention has not been payed to 
compensating hospital providers for their responsibilities for research and education and 
sufficient efforts have not been made to establish new structures for provider collaboration. 
Although this lies beyond the scope of the thesis, the findings also raise questions about 
whether the conditions for responding to the patient choice model are different for hospital 
providers that also handle acute orthopedics, compared to specialized providers handling 
elective care only. This implies that evaluation studies should take aspects of market 
composition and parallel provider assignments into consideration, to capture how certain 
provider characteristics interact with the logics of the economic governance model. In the 
context of big provider organizations, such as a university hospitals represented in Study IV, 
evaluation studies should carefully consider how the local implementation of economic 
efficiency requirements is carried out and what it means in practice at department or unit 
levels. 
 
8.2 PROFESSIONALS’ CONCERN FOR THE OVERALL HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 
The thesis provides insight to professionals’ experience of economic governance being an 
integrated one, in the sense that they understand the requirements imposed on their provider 
organization (and thereby on them) in relation to the functioning of the surrounding health 
care system. The system-level analysis seems to be driven by a concern for the whole patient 
and an awareness of the entire patient journey, including all steps along the care pathway 
preceding and succeeding a professional’s own role and responsibilities.  
The system-level awareness is obvious in Study IV, in which staff members reflect upon and 
show concern for how their patients are treated post-discharge and to what extent other 
stakeholders, such as primary care and social care, will meet their patients’ needs. Based on 
the patients’ serious conditions, commonly requiring life-long support, their awareness might 
not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that their engagement 
also continues when their personal responsibility can be considered accomplished. This 
suggests that dysfunctional stakeholder integration, which has been observed in empirical 
studies to put patients at risk (Auschra, 2018; Leutz, 2005), also could be a risk factor for 
harming professionals’ work environment. These findings further confirm the relevance of 
applying patient-centered care (Myndigheten för Vårdanalys, 2012), emphasizing the 
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importance of putting patients at the center of the care process, rather than how health care 
stakeholders are organized and structured. 
The system-level analysis conducted by professionals in the thesis studies not only focuses on 
patient needs, but also on the economic efficiency of the overall system design. In Study IV, 
respondents emphasize the importance of taking patients’ life-long needs (and costs) of care 
into consideration, suggesting that proactive “expensive” interventions may pay back 
multiple times. The respondents also seem to have a sophisticated understanding of how the 
system is designed and they observe how the separated assignments (and budgets) of 
different provider organizations and stakeholders may provide obstacles for doing what is 
most efficient from a cost perspective. In Studies I and II, limitations on how the choice 
model supports economic efficiency across stakeholders are also identified, for example by 
highlighting the potential cost of incomplete assessments in primary care preceding surgery. 
This is particularly interesting since elective surgery is commonly described as an 
“uncomplicated procedure”, suitable for transferal to freestanding specialized providers 
(Cook et al., 2014). In summary, limitations on stakeholder integration are identified by 
professionals in both empirical settings, representing high and low levels of care complexity. 
The thesis highlights the need for system awareness when designing economic governance 
models, including the coordination of provider types within the health care system and the 
integration of health and social care. Economic governance models should support providers 
in making decisions that are sustainable from a long-term perspective, and from a patient and 
resource use perspective, uniting rather than separating stakeholders. 
The system-level awareness of professionals also includes issues that are of high importance 
to the professional community, such as knowledge development. Further, the responsibility 
for research and education seems to be perceived as a shared responsibility for all 
professionals across provider organizations. This suggests that professionals may not 
primarily identify with (and be loyal to) their provider organization, but rather with the 
broader patient population and with the wider professional community, anchored in a concern 
for the functioning of the overall health care system. This is consistent with empirical 
findings in the field of PSM, emphasizing that the motivational orientation in public services 
goes beyond organizational boundaries, and is concerned with the interest of the larger public 
community (Perry et al., 2010). This raises questions about the effectiveness of applying 
competition in health care markets, relying on the assumption that professionals employed by 
provider organizations primarily want to do what is best for the provider. The thesis also 
provides reasons for questioning whether professionals want to take a competitive position 
toward professional colleagues at other providers, if collaboration is a more appropriate (or 
even necessary) strategy. To put it simply, if competition does not serve the purpose of 
fulfilling the overall aims of health care systems, then why should they compete? However, 
this does not mean that the establishment of different provider types and the freedom of 
choice for patients are wrong. On the contrary, there are many potential upsides of multiple 
actors and diversity in health care markets, but the assumption that that professionals’ will to 
compete is a strong driving force behind increased provider performance in competitive 
  69 
health care markets does not find support in the thesis. To conclude, the thesis provides 
multiple arguments for applying a system-level approach, including the perspectives of all 
stakeholders involved along the patient pathway, as well as the professional community when 
designing economic governance models. 
 
8.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF PROFESSIONAL VALUES 
The thesis shows that professional values committed to safeguarding patient needs play an 
important role for professionals’ experience of economic governance, which is observed at 
the manager and staff level.  
Professionals across the thesis studies constantly seem to place economic efficiency 
requirements in relation to their professional duty to meet patient needs of treatment and care, 
also considering aspects of quality and equity. Although the participants emphasize the 
reasonableness of managing resources efficiently and show acceptance toward the fact that 
resources always will be limited in health care, it seems conditional that this should not bring 
substantial harm to patients. The thesis thereby confirms the literature on professionalism, 
stating the professional ethos to protect patients is fundamental to the professional role 
(Swick, 2000). 
The professionals’ reasoning is characterized by their concern for the atypical patient who 
does not fit the model, and thereby becomes vulnerable. In Studies I and II respondents 
express concern for the few patients who (due to insufficient inclusion criteria) are 
misclassified as low risk, although having more extensive care needs. In Study IV concerns 
are raised for patients whose individual needs will be considered too costly and thereby not 
sufficiently supported when the rehabilitation period is over. This might to some extent be 
unavoidable, since economic governance models are defined at the system-level based on the 
typical needs of typical patients. However, the thesis shows the need for acknowledging 
atypical and unpredictable events in the design of economic governance models to enable 
flexibility for professionals, who on the contrary meet individual patients whose clinical 
profiles will deviate more or less from the average.  
The high priority of the professional ethos manifests in professional behaviors going against 
system requirements when patients are put at risk. In Study IV, staff members describe 
strategies of trying to find ways around the system, when it provides obstacles for 
individualizing care. Similarly, the professional managers in Study II state that they have 
occasionally felt forced to overrule the economic logics of the patient choice model to protect 
patients, at the expense of the provider organization. Again, this suggests that professionals 
identify strongly with their patients and that their loyalty to patients will overarch that of the 
organization if patients are put at risk. The thesis findings thereby also confirm the substantial 
impact of internal reward processes driving behaviors of going around or against system 
requirements and incentives logics, which has been observed and described in the 
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motivational literature in several academic disciplines (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gneezy et al., 
2011; Perry et al., 2010; Swick, 2000). 
The importance of health care managers having a more general awareness of professional 
values is also reflected in the thesis, which confirms the literature emphasizing that 
professionally trained managers have an advantage in health care organizations (Lega et al., 
2013). The adaption to professional values is reflected in the managerial strategies observed 
in Study II, trying to increase the motivational impact at the staff level by translating the 
economically warranted needs for change into improvement initiatives, assuring staff that 
quality will come first. The relevance of the translational strategy that is described by 
managers themselves in Study II finds some support in Study IV, in which staff members 
emphasize the importance of their managers keeping a reasonable balance between increasing 
the economic awareness among staff and still maintaining focus on patients. There also seems 
to be a communicative style that is perceived as more successful in the current contexts. This 
is described from a managerial perspective in Study II, in terms of managers avoiding a too 
financially colored language that might be perceived as provocative by staff. This resonates 
with staff members’ experiences in Study IV, where they express that they do not want to see 
themselves turned into financial officers. The thesis thereby substantiates the ability of 
professional managers to adapt the communication and management style to the motivational 
preference of staff, which is described in the literature (Postma et al., 2015). The managers’ 
ability to integrate economic and quality requirements by using their professional expertise to 
assess how efficiency strategies could be implemented to also support quality improvement, 
observed in Studies I and II, is also consistent with the literature on professional hybridity 
(Noordegraaf, 2011). 
This thesis provides no simple answer to when harm to professional values becomes a serious 
problem. Nevertheless, the thesis highlights the potential risk of misalignment between 
economic governance models and patient needs, not only for the sake of patients but also to 
avoid creating a harmful work environment for professionals. In Study I, the participants 
clearly express that the reason behind the strategy of overruling is to protect the well-being of 
their staff and themselves. In Study IV, respondents acknowledge that serious limitations to 
professional autonomy to meet patient needs would substantially impair job satisfaction. 
These findings show similarities with case studies in primary care settings, that identify risks 
for reduced job satisfaction when economic governance models are too narrowly defined 
(Campbell et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2007). The thesis findings also resonates with the 
literature on stress and burnout among the health care workforce, identifying emotional strain 
as a potential downside of professional empathy, if workers are put in situations where they 
feel forced to provide insufficient care (Larson & Yao, 2005). Although we cannot provide an 
exact cutoff level representing the point of “enough is enough” for professionals, the GOV-
EQ scale developed in Study III provides tools for monitoring the autonomy of professionals 
in meeting patient needs and the perceived alignment between available resources and patient 
needs on an organizational level. By collecting data across provider organizations and over 
time, risk areas could be identified and further explored, guiding appropriate actions before 
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too much damage is done. To conclude, the thesis provides substantial arguments for the 
importance of aligning economic governance models to professional values and for 
considering the implications for professionals’ work environments, which supports the 
relevance of the quadruple aim that also acknowledges the pursuit of improving the 
experience of care delivery (Sikka et al., 2015).  
 
8.4 INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATING TO MANAGE ECONOMIC RESOURCES 
Based on the previous sections which describe the challenges in designing economic 
governance models and the importance of acknowledging professional values the reader 
might think this thesis is positioned against the use of economic governance models to 
increase the economic efficiency of health care. This is not the case. On the contrary, the 
thesis findings show that professionals find it meaningful and are motivated to contribute to 
resources being efficiently used, and identify many valid reasons for doing so.  
In Studies I and II, managers describe that actions have been taken to increase the efficiency 
of the care flow and express appreciation for the bundle payment principle, providing clinical 
freedom to decide how to best use resources. This might not come as a surprise, since the 
responsibility of resource use is embedded in the managerial role and thereby represents the 
hybrid demands (Noordegraaf, 2011) put on health care managers. In addition, from a 
managerial (Hales, 1999) and motivational perspective (Michie et al., 2005), it makes 
perfectly sense that managers are motivated to respond to requirements imposed on 
organizational level, since their responsibility for making it happen is clearly part of their 
organizational role. What might be more surprising is that the thesis studies show that 
professionals at staff level also express engagement in economic issues, despite having no 
formal responsibility for the unit’s budget or resource use. In Study IV, both survey and 
interview data suggest that staff members are motivated to contribute to resources being 
efficiently used. In addition, the managers in Study II emphasize that although staff members 
are primarily interested in organizational performance represented by quality indicators, 
resource use is not at all indifferent to them. This partly contradicts the empirical findings 
suggesting that professionals at the staff level are more hesitant toward economic 
requirements, perceiving this to be potential threat to the quality of care, compared to the 
perceptions of professional managers (Storkholm et al., 2017).  
In the literature on provider payment models, critique has been raised regarding the use of 
financial incentives at the provider level only, since this provides no incentives at the 
individual level in provider organizations where a majority of professionals are salaried 
(Robinson, 2001). Although there might be a few exceptions (among the participants 
representing private providers in Studies I and II), the vast majority of participants in the 
thesis studies are salaried professionals employed by public providers. So, even though there 
are no obvious financial rewards, why do they seem to care about efficient resource use? The 
findings of Study IV suggest that there are many reasons for professionals at the staff level to 
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engage in issues of economic efficiency. Reducing unnecessary activities (and resource use) 
is described as enabling opportunities to increase the activities that provide value for patients, 
which can be regarded as an additional strategy to live up to the professional ethos (Swick, 
2000). The positive association between managing economic resources and the quality of 
care is further supported by the positive correlations across subscale A and B in the GOV-EQ 
Scale, suggesting that individuals who are knowledgeable and motivated to engage in issues 
of economic efficiency also seem to be more knowledgeable about and engaged in improving 
the quality of care, or vice versa. The thesis thereby provides no support for the inherent 
conflict between economic efficiency requirements and quality of care that is occasionally 
emphasized in the academic discourse of professionalism arguing that imposing requirements 
on professionals to reduce health care spending may threaten the core of medical 
professionalism (Wynia, 2009). Instead, the thesis findings may be interpreted as a sign of 
hybridity (Noordegraaf, 2007) also present among staff, proposing that professionals at 
multiple organizational levels have the ability to integrate multiple health care demands in a 
synergetic rather than conflicting way. Similar ideas of the two-sided responsibility of public 
servants has been described in the Swedish public administration literature and represented in 
the “civil servant ethos” (Lundquist, 2001). It emphasizes the equal importance of protecting 
individuals’ needs of support from the welfare state, and still act as a gate keeper for 
individuals’ access to welfare services, to protect the overall public resources. The inbuilt 
dilemma for public servants balancing individual needs against the formal regulations of 
public services has also been described in the policy literature that explores the key role of 
street-level bureaucrats for the implementation of governance and policy applications 
(Brodkin, 2012). 
In Study IV, using resources efficiently is also described as meaningful from a professional 
perspective, since saved resources may be used to invest in professional training and 
knowledge development. This is considered to be beneficial for patients and to be an 
important motivational factor for professionals who appreciate the development of new skills 
and expertise. The motivational impact of professional development is further confirmed by 
the managerial strategy of personalizing rewards observed in Study II. These findings are 
consistent with motivational theory proposing that competence development is a fundamental 
intrinsic motivator (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and highlighting the importance of considering 
professional development and the acquisition of new skills when trying to improve health 
care systems’ ability to support a positive experience of care delivery (Sikka et al., 2015). 
In Study IV, the participants also describe their engagement in resources being efficiently 
used by taking the perspective as taxpayers. The importance of economic resources being 
fairly and reasonably used is emphasized, and the participants’ reasoning reflects a sense of 
personal relationship, or even ownership, of the publically funded resources, although their 
personal contribution represents a relatively small proportion of the health care budget. When 
sharing experiences of resources being unreasonably used participants expressed a strong 
commitment to these issues, and although more efficient use of resources will never get them 
their tax money back, it is almost as though the waste of public resources evokes a sense of 
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being stolen from. From a psychological perspective, the subjective assessment of how well 
health care resources are used in relation to internal convictions of how resources should be 
used is a perfectly valid motivator (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The individual engagement in how 
resources are used might be influenced by the Swedish health care system which is to a large 
degree publically funded, and in that sense public funds are an extension of the individual’s 
money. However, this might not provide a full explanation, since the literature on PSM 
provides empirical examples showing that motivational preferences of doing what is best 
from a public perspective are also present in countries with a lower degree of public funding 
of welfare services, such as the United States (Vandenabeele, 2014). 
To conclude, although identifying the underlying reasons behind why professionals engage in 
issues of economic efficiency goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the thesis findings show 
that professionals are intrinsically motivated to contribute to economic resources being 
efficiently used. In addition, the notion that their engagement requires financial rewards at an 
individual level (through, e.g., provider payment models) finds no clear support in this thesis.  
 
8.5 THE CONDITIONS FOR BEHAVIOR CHANGE  
The thesis provides data on professionals’ experiences of economic governance that 
encourages a more general reflection on the overall conditions for behavior change in 
response to economic efficiency requirements, considering external and internal factors that 
may facilitate or hinder desired behaviors. Overall, the thesis studies suggest that neither 
knowledge nor intrinsic motivation is missing at the professional level for appropriate 
behaviors to occur. However, the rewarding consequences provided by the external 
environment seem to be insufficient to reinforce professional behaviors contributing to 
economic efficiency, which seems to be linked to the scope of the economic requirements 
and how these are implemented in practice. 
Applying theoretical perspectives of behavior change (Michie et al., 2011; Skinner, 1963) to 
the thesis context includes the consideration of available antecedents and the immediate 
consequences of desired behaviors, as well as the contingencies for how these factors are 
interlinked. A good start for changing peoples’ behaviors is that the desired behaviors are 
clearly defined and articulated. In the thesis studies, the appropriate behaviors used to 
respond to the specific governance models are defined within the provider organizations and 
across studies it seems quite clear to managers and staff what they can do. The studies also 
show that antecedents for behaviors are provided through instructions and guidelines, which 
are communicated through dialogue between managers and staff. In summary, the 
participants seem to know what to do, and they do it if they have the opportunity. (The more 
complicated issue of whether this is enough to attain the economic requirements will be saved 
for later.) From a motivational perspective (Michie et al., 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
sufficient internal reward processes seem to be in place to maintain behaviors, based on 
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professionals finding meaning in managing resources efficiently as long as doing so does not 
entail substantial harm to patients.   
However, the contingencies of external reward processes do not seem optimal from a 
behavioral perspective. When managers in Study II describe their efforts to operationalize 
tasks and provide feedback for staff, there seem to be challenges in accessing valid data on 
how resources are used. In addition, current economic figures are described as being too 
loosely linked to what staff members do and are therefore less useful as a motivational tool. 
Access to economic data is, of course, dependent on how resource use and costs are 
calculated and monitored within specific provider organizations and the level of complexity 
of the care provided. For example, in the first empirical case, one may assume that there 
would be greater challenges for the hospital providers who handle acute and elective care 
within multiple orthopedic domains to identify the resources used by patients assigned to the 
choice model, compared to specialized providers primarily managing the patient choice 
model. However, cost calculation is described as a generally challenging task for health care 
organizations (Keel, Savage, Rafiq, & Mazzocato, 2017), and the lack of valid data to support 
the analysis on how to increase economic efficiency and to enable feedback may be a 
universal challenge across providers. Based on the lack of appropriate data, there is also a risk 
that focus is directed toward what is easily measurable, such as purchasing costs, which 
might not be the best strategy for improving the overall efficiency of resource use.  
In Study IV, respondents also describe staff behaviors (to increase economic efficiency) and 
rewarding consequences as being insufficiently linked in the sense that it is not clear to staff 
how their efforts make a difference. The metaphor of local savings disappearing into “the big 
black hole” of the large hospital was used several times during interviews to illustrate the lack 
of clarity regarding how local efforts are used to support the organization. Also previous 
experiences of how local savings have been “rewarded” by reduced resource allocation the 
following year stand as an example of how certain decisions may be perceived as a 
punishment from the individual perspective, which may explain some of the reported 
skepticism. Although there might be valid reasons behind such decisions, there is a risk that 
individuals perceive this as inadequate recognition of their efforts, which may have a 
demotivating effect. From a behavioral perspective, an increased mandate to decide on how 
savings are used and increased clarity on how saved resources are used to add value for 
patients (and professionals) in the organization are important factors necessary to increase the 
level of perceived reward among professionals and thereby encourage future engagement in 
economic issues. 
The limitations of external reward processes that are described in the thesis raise questions 
about the general conditions for behavior change in times when health care providers face 
major economic constraints. In Study IV, the discrepancy between what individual staff 
members can do and what needs to be done to cope with the hospital’s major budget 
constraints, seems to be a risk factor that undermines staff motivation, although they could 
make an appropriate contribution. In the light of recent reports stating that a majority of 
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Swedish regions will face major economic challenges ahead (SKL, 2018a), the thesis reflects 
the importance of carefully designing how saving requirements are implemented in provider 
organizations (and at departments and units), to provide reasonable conditions for 
professionals to behave accordingly. There might also be opportunities for local managers to 
proactively handle experiences of unobtainable economic requirements, by focusing on what 
is expected by individual staff members and to clearly distinguish this from the challenges at 
provider or regional level.  
In summary, applying a behavioral analysis perspective on the conditions for professionals to 
respond to economic efficiency requirements suggests that the lack of positive consequences 
in the external environment seems to be a challenge for behavior change over time. Again, 
the desired external reward do not primarily appear to be monetary in nature; instead, the 
rewarding effects of being able to influence how resources are utilized and to see how 
individual efforts contribute to improving health care are emphasized by professionals.  
 
8.6 THE ROLE OF MANAGERS AND SYSTEM TRUST 
Although the thesis shows that managers apply strategies to align the prevailing governance 
models with professional values, and that staff appreciate their efforts, the thesis also reflects 
that the role of managers as intermediaries between the system and staff level is limited. This 
is because staff experiences also include their perception of the overall system, which 
managers have limited control over. 
In Study IV, staff members rate their opportunities to influence economic issues as low. The 
interview data clarify that although they do what they can within their scope of action, they 
perceive little influence over overall resource allocation. Staff members also perceive their 
unit managers as having a limited mandate to influence economic decisions and that there is a 
distance between those making financial decisions at the top-management level and those 
who work on the ground. In Study II, similar experiences of distance are expressed, although 
the participating managers mainly address the level of policy makers when calling for a 
closer dialogue. The experience of having little influence over economic issues reflected in 
the thesis contrasts to the positive effects of budgetary involvement reported in the literature, 
contributing to more positive attitudes among professionals toward financial control 
(Macinati, 2010) and increased financial performance (Macinati & Rizzo, 2016). Additional 
literature on health care management also emphasizes the importance of professional 
managers’ involvement and influence over how tasks are defined (Goodall, 2011; Lega et al., 
2013), which seems to be a limitation in regard to economic decision making in the empirical 
settings included in the thesis. Although investigating how economic decisions have been 
made at the top-management and descending management levels lies outside the scope of this 
thesis, the findings suggest that there are limitations to overly top-down oriented approaches 
to increasing economic efficiency in limiting professional engagement - at least as perceived 
by professionals themselves.  
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Although health care professionals can be assumed to have limited influence over how the 
overall health care system functions, they seem recurrently preoccupied with assessing how 
the system works. The notion of “the system” seems to refer to the broader health care system 
in the region and appears to be constituted by multiple perceptions, ranging from the 
information they get at their own unit and provider organization, to that gained from being 
patients or relatives themselves. In Study IV, participants describe how they reflect on how 
resources are used in general, and that they judge the actions of important figureheads in the 
organization. The focus of their analysis seems to be to what extent decisions contribute to 
improving the value provided by the system to the overall beneficiary population. Selfish 
actions or obviously inappropriate use of the system’s limited resources seem particularly 
provocative. Also in Study I, the professional managers’ in-depth analysis of the 
consequences of the patient choice model and their concern for system flaws reflects a 
general awareness of the overall functioning of the system.  
Although the thesis does not provide clear answers on what influences perceived system 
flaws have, this might be at risk of undermining professionals overall trust in the health care 
system and in decision makers. In Study IV, there seem to be a link between staff members’ 
assessment of the system’s reasonableness and their willingness to act in accordance with 
system requirements. The findings reflect a kind of required mutuality, in the sense that staff 
members seem willing to do their part if they believe that other system actors do theirs. 
Although a system is a more complex creature than single persons are, this perception shows 
interesting similarities with the observed impact of perceived trust (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 
2007) and reciprocity (Fehr & Falk, 2002) on behavior, as described in the literature of 
behavioral economics. Empirical studies suggest that prosocial behavior increases if 
individuals trust their counterparts to be prosocial and that reciprocity works both ways, 
which means that egoistic and non-collaborative behavior increase the likelihood of 
punishing behavior in return (Fehr & Falk, 2002). The literature also proposes that there is a 
learning effect of reciprocity, which means that historic and recent behaviors are included in 
the assessment of counterparts (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). This resonates with the 
observations in Study IV, in which participants emphasize that the long history of economic 
constraints and the insufficient acknowledgement of individual efforts to reduce costs 
negatively influence their expectations.  
In summary, the thesis provides insights to the conditions for managers to act as 
intermediaries. The findings indicate that managers’ ability to influence staffs’ experience of 
economic efficiency requirements is influenced by the level of mandate, and by staff 
members’ trust in the surrounding health care system as reasonable. Although the 
undermining effects of system distrust may be challenging to study and test empirically, the 
thesis raises questions about the symbolic nature of the decisions and actions made by key 
persons in top- management positions in health care systems, which may have a substantial 
impact further down in the organization.  
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8.7 COPRODUCTION OF VALID ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE  
The thesis studies reflect challenges and opportunities with engaging professionals in 
increasing the economic efficiency of health care. Still, this remains one of the major 
challenges for future health care systems. The thesis suggests that closer collaboration 
between stakeholders at the professional, provider, and policy level may be beneficial, 
representing multiple perspectives on how resources can be more intelligently used, to 
improve economic efficiency and quality of health care. 
The thesis provides insights into the complexity of economic governance that makes the idea 
of designing a perfect model in advance unrealistic, which raises questions about how the 
processes for governance and policy making may be improved. Based on the thesis findings, 
there seems to be a need for a more adaptive and flexible governance process that enables 
revisions of current governance practices. The thesis also reflects the need for establishing 
forums that brings professionals, provider representatives, and policy makers together to 
attain shared goals. Thereby the thesis confirms the relevance of coproduction in health care 
governance. The concept of coproduction originates from theories on service production, and 
its emphasis on focusing on service users as active agents in service production has been 
increasingly acknowledged in health care by the use of concepts such as self-managed care 
and patient-centeredness (Batalden et al., 2015). The key role of coproduction has also been 
acknowledged in the academic literature on public management, arguing that public 
management has been overly reliant on manufacturing logics, underestimating the central 
aspect of health care being a service. Adopting a service-oriented approach implies that 
public services should be coproduced, bringing key stakeholders together and putting the 
experience of service users at heart of public service design (Osborne, Radnor, & Nasi, 
2013), which resonates with professionals’ experiences described in the thesis.  
The thesis findings further highlight the important role of evidence as a base for policy-level 
decisions. This is reflected in professionals’ appreciation for clarity on how economic 
governance applications contribute to fulfilling health care aims, which require 
comprehensive data and evaluation of effects. In the literature on evidence-based policy, the 
importance of quantitative and qualitative evidence in documenting policy outcomes is 
emphasized, alongside identifying key factors in the policy process that increase adaption and 
specific policy content that is likely to be effective (Brownson, Chriqui, & Stamatakis, 2009). 
Arguments suggesting that professionals could contribute to policy evaluation have already 
been brought forward in this thesis. However, an increased use of evidence in policy making 
might also have positive effects on professionals apart from improving policy-level decisions 
as such. Based on health care professionals being extensively trained to apply principles of 
evidence-based practice, one may assume that policy-level decisions that appear to be 
anchored in evidence on what works (and why), rather than political ideology, are 
experienced as more credible in the eyes of professionals. In summary, the thesis suggests 
that an increased use of evidence to guide policy-level decisions and increased collaboration 
uniting system stakeholders may contribute to a more valid economic governance, in the 
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sense that imposed efficiency requirements are perceived as being reasonable and actionable 
by professionals, which might facilitate their response. 
The idea of increasing trust in professionals to act autonomously that currently influences the 
Swedish debate on public management, resonates with the thesis findings supporting 
professional autonomy to meet patient needs to be a fundamental motivator. However, when 
reading the conclusions and recommendations made by The delegation of trust 
(Tillitsdelegationen) (SOU 2018:47, 2018), the argumentation behind increasing professional 
autonomy appears to mainly focus on its positive impact on the quality of public services and 
on mitigating the negative impact of extensive control systems associated with NPM. 
Strategies for how the governance of economic efficiency is to be handled are less salient. 
Although the proposed arguments for increasing professional autonomy are very valid, there 
might be a risk that the important issue of increasing economic efficiency is left in the shade. 
Guided by the thesis findings, it can be argued that professionals are not only an important 
resource for ensuring quality of public services but are also important for managing resources 
efficiently. Based on my experiences from the thesis project I personally believe that 
professional representation and involvement in finding solutions to the resource challenge in 
health care is vital, by using their insights on how resources may be used in smarter ways 
without having a substantial impact on the quality and equity of care. Professionals cannot 
afford to stand back on these issues and are needed to ensure that strategies and priorities for 
increasing economic efficiency are reasonable and sustainable from a patient and work 
environment perspective. Still, only by recognizing this as a shared mission that requires the 
collaboration of all system stakeholders and a willingness from all parties to acknowledge 
other actors’ viewpoints, will the best way forward be identified. 
 
8.8 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND VALIDITY OF FINDINGS 
Conducting research relies on the assumption that by applying scientific methods, we can 
make valid conclusions based on our findings. In general terms, research validity refers to the 
accuracy or appropriateness of inferences and conclusions made from a scientific study 
(Adam Kelly, O'Malley, Kallen, & Ford, 2005). Distinctions are made between internal 
validity, referring to the soundness of the design, and external validity, which refers to in 
what way findings are generalizable (Morgan, Gliner, & Harmon, 1999). Thus, research 
validity includes not only the validity of a specific method, but all components of a study, 
ranging from the formulation of research questions, the choice of study design and methods, 
and the choice of the target population, to the conclusions (Adam Kelly et al., 2005). 
Differences when assessing research validity across research paradigms should be 
acknowledged, including different standards for assessing quantitative and qualitative studies 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). 
The overall validity of the thesis findings will be reflected on by considering multiple aspects 
of the empirical studies. To begin, the choice of study designs and study settings will be 
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discussed. Thereafter, aspects of reliability and validity will be discussed in relation to 
specific methods of data collection and analysis, in accordance with established criteria. Last, 
the overall generalizability of the thesis findings will be explored.  
 
8.8.1 Study designs 
A general limitation to the design of the studies is that each study is conducted using only one 
empirical case (although Studies I and II include several provider organizations), which 
causes uncertainties in regard to the specificity of the findings in relation to other contexts. In 
addition, data is collected during one period, which limits the understanding about 
longitudinal changes of the observations and experiences that the studies address. Although 
the thesis as a whole addresses the perspectives of managers and staff, the individual studies 
have limitations in that data is collected from one target group at a time. Thus, there are 
uncertainties in regard to if the subjective experiences of managers also are shared by staff 
members within the same provider organization, and vice versa. In addition, all studies are 
limited to omitting the policy-level perspective, not including data describing the formal 
decisions and intentions behind the current governance applications. Similarly, the studies are 
limited by not including the top-management perspective of provider organizations.  
The findings in Studies I and II provide insights about the conditions for implementing the 
patient choice model being slightly different across provider types and show important 
differences in regard to parallel assignments and organizational characteristics, which may 
have influenced the study participants’ perspectives. This may not have been sufficiently 
captured by the current study designs. 
 
8.8.2 Selection of cases and sampling of study participants  
8.8.2.1 Selection of cases  
The selection of empirical cases can be reflected on from the perspective of being good 
representatives of the phenomena of interest, namely economic governance models applied in 
health care, and how they fit the purpose of the studies. From a Swedish perspective, Case 1 
can be regarded as an “extreme” case, applying patient choice in specialized care, since few 
regions have chosen similar arrangements. Although this provides few comparative cases and 
brings uncertainties in regard to the validity of findings in other settings, the studies can still 
provide valuable insight for future policy applications by highlighting the importance of a 
thorough consequence analysis and the ability to make revisions if unintended consequences 
arise. Case 1 can also be considered to be more of typical case with perspective on the trend 
of moving elective, low-risk care outside hospitals, and insights from the study could be used 
as a reference in other cases of structural change, not necessarily including provider 
competition and similar incentive models.  
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Case 2 can be regarded as more typical, based on many public hospitals applying similar 
budget arrangements and sharing the challenges of economic constraints. However, Study IV 
highlights the important role of local implementation, which implies that the rather blunt tool 
of economic governance through (restricted) annual budgets should be analyzed with great 
attention toward how specific saving requirements strikes at specific departments and units.  
8.8.2.2 Sampling of provider organizations and departments 
Although a purposeful sampling strategy was applied in Studies I and II to recruit a broad 
representation of provider organizations, it, to some extent, also represents a convenience 
sample. There were challenges in recruiting private specialized providers, including the 
decline of two providers, which might have influenced the study results. Also, for Studies III 
and IV, efforts were made to recruit several departments and clinical units at the same 
hospital. However, they declined participation due to substantial financial constraints and a 
high work load. The current economic situation at the participating department in Studies III 
and IV was described as being relatively balanced, compared to other departments. This 
raises questions about if the experiences would have been substantially different in units 
under more acute economic pressure, such as facing staff reductions or organizational 
change. 
8.8.2.3 Sampling of participants 
For the qualitative data collection in Studies I, II, and IV, purposeful sampling was applied to 
recruit participants. However, the assessment of what persons who had relevant experiences 
for the study was made in a dialogue with operation- or unit managers, who were the 
speaking partners when establishing contact with the provider organizations. This might serve 
as a limitation, since the recruitment of participants was shaped by individual manager’s 
interpretations of our needs and by their subjective judgement of what persons who might be 
appropriate. Also, the individual manager’s time to engage in recruitment and their 
relationship to individual staff members might have influenced staff members’ willingness to 
participate.  
In Studies III and IV, a total sampling strategy was used to include all members of staff. 51 % 
responded to the survey, which raises questions about the study sample’s representativeness 
and what factors might characterize staff members who filled out (and declined to fill out) the 
survey. In addition, the representativeness of the staff at the Department of Rehabilitation 
Medicine in relation to the larger population of health care staffs is unclear. 
 
8.8.3 Considerations of qualitative methods 
In the qualitative research field, multiple guidelines and criteria for assessing the quality of 
qualitative studies exist, although they are extensively debated (Malterud, 2001b). Advocates 
representing the constructivist paradigm state that criteria used to assess rigor in the 
quantitative field cannot be used for qualitative studies, and propose alternative criteria, such 
  81 
as credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability (Guba, 1981) to replace the 
traditional (positivistic) criteria of validity and generalizability. However, representatives for 
the realism view (Mays & Pope, 2000) argue that qualitative research can be assessed using 
the same broad criteria, but in a different way. Validity has been proposed as a broad criterion 
for assessing quality in qualitative research, suggesting specific activities to improve it. This 
includes the triangulation of methods or data sources, respondent validation and the attention 
to deviant cases. Providing a clear account of the trails of data collection and analysis is also 
emphasized as being critical to ensure the retest reliability of a study. The reliability of the 
analysis is also suggested to be improved by inviting additional researchers to the analysis 
and comparing alternate interpretations (Mays & Pope, 1995).  
As the thesis represents more of a realist view than constructivist one, the methodological 
limitations of the qualitative studies will be discussed in accordance with the quality criteria 
presented above (Malterud, 2001b; Mays & Pope, 2000). Studies I and II show some 
limitations in regard to data triangulation, since the study focuses on the experiences of the 
participating managers, which are not confirmed or contrasted by any other data sources. For 
Study I, no formal data was collected to inform the analysis of consequences in general, or to 
follow up on specific observations mentioned in the interviews. Similarly, Study II focuses on 
managers’ perceptions of their strategies as intermediaries, which was not accompanied by 
observational data or data on staff members’ perceptions of their behavior. Thus, the 
subjective nature of the findings in Studies I and II should be acknowledged. In Study IV, on 
the contrary, data triangulation is one of the core components of the mixed method approach 
using quantitative and qualitative data sources. Although respondent validation has not been a 
formal part of the studies, the results of all studies have been presented to representatives of 
the participating provider organizations, and their input on the study findings and conclusions 
have been carefully considered. 
Efforts have been made to increase the structure and transparency of data collection and 
analysis. Research colleagues have familiarized with raw data and have been involved in the 
analytic process to increase reliability by minimizing the risk of the thesis authors’ individual 
bias being overly influential. Careful attention has been shown to the latent versus manifest 
meanings of data when applying a thematic approach, and the risk of “over-interpretation” in 
accordance with theory has been carefully considered when engaging in deductive analysis.  
8.8.3.1 Reflexivity 
In the qualitative field, much attention is directed to how the researcher influences the study 
results. Reflexivity, defined as the researcher’s awareness of how own preconceptions and 
assumptions have shaped the research process, has been described as fundamental for the 
validity of qualitative studies (Mays & Pope, 2000). Reflexivity has also been proposed as a 
specific quality criterion (Malterud, 2001b). To increase reflexivity the role of the researcher 
should continuously be assessed (Mays & Pope, 2000), and subjective preconceptions should 
be reflected upon and declared by the researcher, which includes the involvement of other 
researchers in data analysis to discuss competing conclusions (Malterud, 2001b).  
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The thesis studies generally serve the purpose of exploring various phenomena and there are 
no aspects of the researcher taking an intervening role or trying to influence individuals or the 
organizations. Although the thesis author thereby can be described as an external, neutral 
observer there are many reasons to reflect upon how prior experiences and preconceptions 
might have influenced the studies. Having a professional and clinical background I believe 
my personal experiences might have influenced my understanding of the issues that I have 
explored. Although I have no experience of the care processes included in the thesis, I can 
relate to some of the general challenges that the study participants have shared with me, for 
example the experience of safeguarding patient needs in relation to economic considerations. 
This means that the study participants’ experiences have engaged me, which might have 
influenced my style of interviewing and indirectly shaped the conversation by me paying 
attention to certain things. I have also discovered, when reading interview transcripts, that I 
have occasionally used expressions such as “we” rather than “you” when discussing general 
challenges in clinical work.  
I have made efforts to articulate my own reactions and reflections during data collection to 
discover potential biases. In addition, I have recurrently reflected upon my analysis in relation 
to empirical data. On the other hand, the awareness of my professional background as a 
source of bias might also have made me too cautious to draw conclusions in fear of being 
perceived as partial. Inviting research colleagues to the analytical process has been a strategy 
to unveil my analysis, and the interdisciplinary nature of my supervisory team has provided 
me with multiple perspectives when analyzing the interview data.  
Although my personal experiences might have influenced my objectivity as a researcher, I 
also believe that my professional background has served many advantages. My ability to 
relate to the participants’ experiences might have shown in my reactions to their stories, and 
contributed to them perceiving me as genuinely interested in their experiences, which might 
have influenced their trust in me as a dialogue partner.  
 
8.8.4 Considerations of quantitative methods 
There are certain standards for assessing scale validity, which has been defined as the level of 
theoretical and empirical evidence that support the interpretations made when using a scale 
(Newton & Shaw, 2013). Scale reliability refers to whether a number of items can be 
assumed to measure a construct with (sufficient) precision, which can be considered as a 
condition for validity. Historically, three types of validity (content-, criterion-, and construct-
validity) have dominated scale assessments. However, more contemporary assessment 
models apply a broader approach and identify five areas of evidence for scale validity: the 
content of the scale (1), the response process (2), the internal structure of the scale (3), the 
association with other variables (4), and the consequences of scale use (5). Thus, there is no 
single measure or statistical method to represent scale validity, rather scale validation is an 
ongoing processes integrating multiple perspectives (Furr, 2013). 
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The content of the scale (1) refers to how well scale items represent the underlying construct 
the scale is assumed to reflect, showing similarities to the concept of content-validity. This is 
undermined if irrelevant items are included in a scale, or if items representing important 
aspects of the construct are missing. Content validity can be enhanced during scale 
development, by carefully defining the construct in collaboration with subject matter experts 
(Furr, 2013). In Study III, efforts were made to increase the content validity of the GOV-EQ 
scale, by conducting interviews with the target group to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
identified sub-factors. In addition, an inductive item generation approach was used guided by 
the interview data. Although one could argue that subject matter experts would have been 
more appropriate to consult, the lack of scientific attempts to measure similar constructs 
provided arguments for consulting the target group first. Still, uncertainties remain about 
what settings the scale could be transferred to and still posit sufficient content validity.  
Evidence about the response process (2) refers to what extent the interpretation of items made 
by participants reflects how they should be interpreted (based on the construct definition). 
The response process can be studied using a variety of observational methods provided by the 
cognitive interviewing methodology (Willis, 2004). In Study III, evidence about the response 
process was collected by conducting cognitive interviews prior to data collection, and 
although the interviews pointed at the need for minor revisions only, further improvement 
may have been possible by including more participants.  
The internal structure of the scale (3) refers to how items are related to the underlying 
constructs they are assumed to reflect, and how multiple constructs are interrelated (if using a 
multidimensional scale). Factor analysis is one of the most important tools to assess scale 
dimensionality, accompanied by methods to assess the internal consistency of specific factors 
(Furr, 2013). In Study III, the internal structure of the scale was assessed using EFA and the 
internal consistency of factors was assessed using Cronbachs’ alpha. The EFA showed a 
factor structure supporting the scale’s ability to clearly distinguish between experiences 
related to economic efficiency and quality requirements. However, the results could be 
questioned considering the small sample size, in the light of general guidelines describing 
sample sizes of 100 as poor, 200 as fair and >300 as good (Williams et al., 2010). However, 
these guidelines have been challenged (Fabrigar et al., 1999), and studies reveal that clear 
factor structure, strong factor loadings (Costello & Osborne, 2005) and high communalities 
may compensate for sample sizes below 100 (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). 
Although the sample size should be acknowledged as a disadvantage, the overall results from 
the EFA provide arguments for relying on the overall dimensionality of the scale. However 
the factor structure should be confirmed by a Confirmatory Factor Analysis based on 
supplementary data. In addition, the analysis of internal consistency identified areas of 
improvement for two less robust sub-factors, which should be acknowledged. 
Associations with other variables (4) refer to the association between scale scores and other 
measures of theoretical relevance. This domain is related to the concept of criterion-related 
validity (if the scale can predict a certain measure) and construct validity (if the scale is 
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associated to measures that are theoretically similar) (Furr, 2013). In Study III, the sub-scales’ 
association to another variable was assessed using multiple regression models, which showed 
significant associations between multiple sub-factors and a single item measure of behavioral 
change. This supports the sub-scales’ ability to capture experiences that are relevant for 
behavior change. However, using a single item (which validity has not been assessed in-
depth) as the criterion variable, causes limitations to this approach.   
The consequence of scale use (5) refers to the alignment between how the scale is used and 
the initial purpose of scale development and validation, highlighting the risks of transferring 
scales to other contexts. Future use of the GOV-EQ scale should be preceded by careful 
considerations of the construct definitions and items, ensuring sufficient similarity in regard 
to how economic governance models are experienced at the staff level in the provider setting 
of choice. 
 
8.8.5 Considerations of mixing methods  
In mixed method studies the timing for when methods are mixed, and how, should be 
carefully considered (Creswell & Clark, 2007). A limitation to the study design of Study IV is 
that it relies on the assumption that participants in the focus group interviews could provide 
us with valuable information to guide the interpretation of survey data. There might have 
been shortcomings in the participants’ abilities to comprehend the survey data presented to 
them during the interview sessions, which might have influenced their reasoning. In addition, 
we do not know if the experiences of the interview participants are very different compared to 
the experiences of the larger population of staff. Also, group dynamic processes might have 
influenced individual members reasoning to converge toward a group consensus. 
 
8.8.6 Generalizability  
Based on the exploratory nature of Studies I and II, the findings should be transferred to other 
settings or populations with caution. Still, the findings could contribute to the understanding 
of similar phenomena in other contexts on a theoretical or conceptual level. For example, the 
characteristics of professionals’ consequence analysis, including multiple system levels and 
various types of consequences, may be used as a guiding light to a better understanding of 
patient choice reforms in other settings. In addition, the importance of alignment of economic 
governance models and professional values (to avoid economic efficiency requirements to 
negatively influence patients and professionals) is probably a relevant principle also in other 
governance contexts. Still, the findings of Studies I and II are probably particularly relevant 
for health care settings sharing (any of the) the specific features of Case 1, such as patient 
choice, provider competition, and structural change of care provision.  
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The issue of generalizability in regard to Study III primarily revolves around to what extent 
the scale produces valid data if used in other settings. The promising psychometric properties 
suggest that this could be the case, although additional empirical studies are needed to 
confirm the factor structure. One of the most important conditions for using the scale in other 
contexts is that the construct definitions and items are scrutinized, preferably in dialogue with 
professionals at the staff and manager level to ensure that they fit the provider context and 
how economic governance strategies are perceived at the staff level. Careful attention should 
also be shown to how the written instruction to introduce the scale is formulated.  
Generalizing the findings of Study IV to other contexts can be assumed to be more 
appropriate if they share the features of Case 2, such as to large hospital settings that face 
general requirements of reduced resource use. In addition, the findings may have more 
relevance in professional contexts that share the characteristics of rehabilitation medicine, 
such as including responsibility for patients with complex conditions which implies 
stakeholder collaboration. 
Considering the generalizability of the thesis as a whole, the findings might be more relevant 
for publically funded health care systems, in which professionals also identify with being tax 
payers and are therefore more engaged in how economic resources are used, compared to 
health care contexts dominated by private insurances and out-of-pocket payments.  
 
8.9 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH  
The thesis supports the relevance of future studies exploring the consequences of economic 
governance strategies from the perspective of professionals at the manager and staff levels 
based on the apparent and complex consequences for clinical practice.  
Generally, studies including multiple providers and settings are encouraged to increase the 
understanding of the complex process of turning governance models into practice. A careful 
selection of contrasting cases, taking a policy-level, provider, or management perspective, 
could provide useful insights to the consequences of specific governance models but could 
also shed light on the factors that determine how governance applications are perceived by 
professionals.  
Studies that further explore differences across provider types are encouraged to increase the 
knowledge about how factors such as parallel assignments and complementary steering 
mechanisms interact with economic governance requirements. This is particularly relevant in 
health care markets that apply a mix of public and private providers, partly having different 
roles in relation to the overall health care system.  
Due to the complexity of economic governance, future studies that apply multiple or mixed 
methods are encouraged to provide rich data and enable triangulation of data. The GOV-EQ 
scale could provide a useful tool for capturing staff experiences in regard to economic and 
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quality requirements in larger populations of professionals, although its psychometric 
properties need to be validated in additional settings.  
Since the thesis provides insights to the complex process by which governance models trickle 
down through organizational layers of health care providers, future studies that include data 
across system levels are strongly encouraged. This includes data reflecting the intentions and 
assumptions of policy makers, the local implementation of economic governance 
requirements by top-management in provider organizations, the actions taken by managers 
involved in care delivery and the experiences among staff working close to patients. Studies 
collecting data to illustrate multiple perspectives on the same phenomena may provide 
opportunities for a deeper understanding of the process in which formal requirements are 
interpreted, implemented, and communicated in provider organizations and how this 
influences the subjective experience at the staff level. The discrepancy between policy-level 
intentions and professional perceptions of economic governance, the communicative 
interplay between managers and staff in regard to economic issues and the role of 
professionals’ trust in the overall health care system merits particular attention.  
 
8.10 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
The thesis findings have several implications for practice that address multiple system levels.  
At the policy level, the findings support the importance of aligning economic governance 
models with desired patient outcomes and quality indicators, as well as with a sustainable 
work environment for professionals involved in care delivery. Reimbursement models should 
be designed to support the provision of high-quality care and minimize the risk of crowding 
out effects for vulnerable patients. In addition, reimbursement models should be designed to 
support stakeholder integration and collaboration to minimize the risk of care fragmentation. 
This requires careful consequence analysis in policy making, and on a conceptual level, the 
findings in Study I could function as a roadmap for proactivity. Further, the thesis encourages 
the use of professional perspectives in policy making, using the experiences and insights from 
those working close to patients.  
The thesis further reflects the relevance of forums for policy development and improvement 
that bring policy makers, provider organizations and professionals together in a shared 
mission to get most value out of public resources. Such forums could provide opportunities 
for dialogue but should include processes for data collection and the evaluation of current 
policy applications to inform the improvement process.  
From a top-management perspective, the thesis highlights the important role of the local 
implementation of economic governance requirements in provider organizations. The thesis 
further proposes that decisions at the top-management level, such as strategies for internal 
resource distribution and monitoring of economic performance at the local level, should be 
carefully considered in regard to what it means in practice at the department, unit, and 
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professional level. The thesis suggests that the connection between professional behaviors 
that serves the purpose of increasing economic efficiency and rewarding consequences is 
important for the overall engagement in such issues, which could be facilitated (or hindered) 
by local guidelines and decisions governing resource use. The thesis further suggests that top-
management representatives play an important role in supporting department and line 
managers in making sense of economic governance requirements in dialogue with staff by 
providing them sufficient knowledge and the mandate to do so.  
For professional managers, the thesis provides insights about the importance of applying 
managerial strategies to translate economic governance models into something that is more 
meaningful from a staff perspective by focusing on patient needs and the quality of care. The 
thesis encourages professional managers to operationalize economic governance 
requirements into tasks that are perceived as feasible and relevant to staff without necessarily 
going too in-depth into the financial side of things. Based on Study IV, clinical managers can 
be advised to keep a balanced focus on economic issues in dialogue with staff, but still be 
encouraged to discuss how resource utilization can be optimized, to bring more value for 
patients. The thesis further suggests the importance of managers supporting staff members 
who experience insufficient opportunities to fulfil their professional duty.  
For health care professionals at the staff level, the thesis highlights the importance of 
reflecting on what implications economic requirements have in clinical practice, 
distinguishing between the requirements embedded in the professional role and economic 
challenges at the overall system level, which individual staff members have limited abilities 
to control.  
Last, the thesis reflects the importance of professionals at the staff and manager level to 
continuously identify, communicate and require changes in system flaws that are at risk of 
bringing substantial harm to patients and/or to impair the work environment for the 
professional community.  
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9 CONCLUSIONS  
The thesis concludes that professionals are well aware of economic efficiency requirements 
and intrinsically motivated to manage resources carefully. The thesis challenge the literature 
that emphasizes the importance of designing provider payment to target professional level, by 
concluding that the multiple reasons professionals identify for managing resources efficiency 
may be enough to mobilize change.  
The thesis concludes that professionals at the staff and manager level are aware of and 
engaged in issues of economic efficiency, independent of being accountable for units’ 
financial performance. Professional engagement does not seem limited to organizational 
roles, but is rather rooted in a common concern for the overall health care system to fairly 
provide high-quality care to all patients. The thesis thereby challenges the common notion 
that professionals’ concern for patients is in conflict with economic efficiency requirements, 
concluding that a synergetic integration of multiple health care purposes may be present 
among professional staff and managers. The thesis further suggests that the professional 
concern for the functioning of the health care system also includes the care for a sustainable 
work environment and knowledge development for the professional community. 
Still, the thesis confirms the priority of the professional ethos and concludes that economic 
governance models should be aligned with professional values to meet patient needs, since 
misalignment will impose emotional strain on professionals and contribute to a harmful work 
environment. The importance of managers having the ability to adapt to professional values is 
further confirmed by the thesis and is reflected in the alignment strategies reported by 
managers, as well as in staff members’ descriptions of how they prefer managers to act.  
The thesis provides arguments for professionals being a valuable source of knowledge when 
evaluating economic governance models based on their insights into the complexity of 
consequences evolving over time. The thesis concludes that particular attention should be 
paid to how economic requirements influence the conditions for care delivery and how 
common structures for education and research are affected. The thesis suggests that provider 
collaboration (rather than competition) may be a more appropriate strategy for supporting 
knowledge development.  
The thesis further concludes that health care professionals posit system-level awareness and 
show concern for the entire patient journey, including aspects of economic efficiency, quality, 
and equity of health care. This confirms the need for economic governance models that unites 
stakeholders to make decisions that are sustainable from a long-term perspective.  
The thesis highlights the need for increased collaboration and dialogue, bringing 
professionals and policy makers closer together to design economic governance models that 
efficiently support and balance the multiple aims of health care and that are perceived as valid 
by professionals. In addition, the thesis suggests that the motivational effect of clarifying how 
professionals’ efforts to use resources more efficiently contributes to increased value for 
patients should not be underestimated.  
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10 SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING 
Bakgrund 
Hälso- och sjukvårdssystemet har en mycket central roll i välfärdsstaten genom att säkerställa 
medborgarnas tillgång till sjukvård. Att bedriva sjukvård tar omfattande resurser i anspråk 
och genom medicinsk utveckling och demografiska förändringar står många länder nu inför 
utmaningar där behoven ökar och de ekonomiska resurserna är begränsade. För att möta 
framtida behov behöver sjukvårdens resurser användas mer effektivt och den ekonomiska 
styrningen av vården präglas alltmer av styrmodeller som uppmuntrar både offentliga och 
privata vårdgivare att bli mer effektiva. Användandet av ekonomiska ersättningsmodeller och 
ökad konkurrens mellan vårdgivare som medel för att stimulera till ökad effektivitet har 
kommit att få alltmer uppmärksamhet.  
Forskningen som utvärderar hur ekonomiska styrmodeller fungerar visar dock inte på några 
entydiga resultat och det saknas fortfarande kunskap om hur den ekonomiska styrningen 
påverkar hälso- och sjukvården, både ur ett resurs- och kvalitetsperspektiv. Förvånansvärt få 
studier belyser professionens upplevelse, trots att en förändring av deras beteenden i den 
kliniska vardagen är en förutsättning för att förändring ska ske på vårdgivarnivå.  
Forskning om hur organisationer fungerar och kunskap om ledarskap kan bidra till förståelsen 
för hur den ekonomiska styrningens krav påverkar de som arbetar kliniskt. Studier på hälso- 
och sjukvårdsområdet har t.ex. visat att ledarens förmåga att anpassa yttre krav till 
vårdprocessens karaktär och till professionella värderingar är en nyckelfaktor för att 
organisationen ska nå sina mål. Även motivationsforskningen kan bidra genom att visa på 
betydelsen av inre motivationsfaktorer för att åstadkomma förändring och vikten av att yttre 
krav (och belöningar) ligger i linje med individens egna drivkrafter. Motivationsforskning 
inom offentlig sektor har t.ex. visat att den inre tillfredställelsen av att bedriva god vård och 
möta patienten behov är en särskilt viktig motivationsfaktor för personer som arbetar inom 
hälso- och sjukvården.   
Avhandlingen sammanför hälso- och sjukvårdssystemets olika nivåer genom sitt fokus på hur 
den ekonomiska styrningen uppfattas (snarare än styrmodellens formella utformning), när 
den sipprar ner från beslutsfattare och tjänstemän för att nå de organisationer som bedriver 
vård, till att slutligen påverka professionen i arbetet med patienten. 
 
Syfte 
Avhandlingen syftar till att utforska hur sjukvårdens professioner upplever den ekonomiska 
styrningen av vården.  
Avhandlingens studier syftar specifikt till att utforska professionens perspektiv på 
konsekvenserna av en specifik ekonomisk styrmodell som innefattar vårdval inom elektiv 
ortopedi (Studie I), vilka strategier chefer och ledare använder sig av för att sammanlänka en 
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rådande ekonomisk styrmodell och medarbetarnas motivation (Studie II), samt att undersöka 
hur medarbetare upplever kraven på ekonomisk effektivitet i sitt kliniska arbete (Studie IV). 
Avhandlingen innehåller också en metodstudie (Studie III) som syftar till att utveckla en 
självskattningsskala som mäter medarbetares upplevelser av styrningen av ekonomisk 
effektivitet och kvalitet i hälso- och sjukvården, samt utvärdera dess psykometriska 
egenskaper.  
 
Metoder 
Avhandlingen utforskar två praktiska exempel av ekonomisk styrning. Det första innefattar 
en lokal vårdvalsmodell inom elektiv ortopedi, där den ekonomiska styrningen präglas av 
ökad konkurrens mellan vårdgivare och ekonomiska incitament. Modellen vilar även på en 
strukturell förändring av vårdgivarnas uppdrag, genom att specifika patientgrupper förflyttas 
från sjukhusen till fristående, specialiserade vårdgivare. Det andra exemplet innefattar en mer 
traditionell form av ekonomisk styrning, där en fast årlig budget används i styrningen av ett 
stort offentligt universitetssjukhus, som vid studiernas genomförande stod inför ett ansträngt 
ekonomiskt läge och besparingskrav. 
Studie I och II vänder sig till flera av vårdvalets vårdgivare och är utformade som utforskande 
kvalitativa studier. Studierna baseras på intervjuer med professionella i ledande funktioner. 
Studie III tillämpar etablerade metoder för utveckling och utvärdering av 
självskattningsskalor och har fokus på professionella på medarbetarnivå. Trots att den 
psykometriska utvärderingen bygger på analys av kvantitativ enkätdata så innehåller 
utvecklingsprocessen även inslag av kvalitativ metod. Studie IV bibehåller fokus på 
medarbetare och en mix-metod-design tillämpas för att samla in kompletterande kvalitativ 
intervju-data för att vägleda tolkningen av den enkätdata som samlats in i Studie III.  
 
Resultat 
Studie I visar att professionen uppfattar vårdvalsmodellens konsekvenser som 
mångfacetterade. Det inkluderar konsekvenser för vårdens organisation, för patienterna, för 
professionens arbetsmiljö samt för utbildning och forskning. Professionens analys 
kännetecknas vidare av att vårdvalsmodellens konsekvenser analyseras både utifrån den egna 
organisationen och utifrån det regionala sjukvårdssystemet som helhet.  
Studie II visar att professionella i ledande roller använder sig av strategier för att 
sammanlänka den ekonomiska styrmodellens krav med medarbetarnas drivkrafter och 
professionella värderingar, bl.a. genom att motivera till förändring med fokus på kvalitet och 
nyttan för patienten.  
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Studie III beskriver utvecklingen och utvärderingen av en självskattningsskala som bedöms 
ha förmågan att mäta medarbetares upplevelser av styrning av ekonomisk effektivitet 
(Subskala A) och kvalitet (Subskala B), samt ha goda psykometriska egenskaper. 
Studie IV visar att medarbetare är medvetna om kraven på effektiv resursanvändning och 
motiverade till att ta ekonomiska hänsyn i det kliniska arbetet, under förutsättning att det inte 
innebär en betydande risk för patienten. Medarbetarna i studien upplever små möjligheter att 
påverka hur de ekonomiska resurserna i allmänhet fördelas och ser vissa begränsningar i 
hälso- och sjukvårdssystemets förmåga att möta patienternas behov längs med hela 
vårdkedjan. Medarbetarnas engagemang för patienten tycks inte vara begränsat till deras 
organisatoriska roller, utan istället vara grundat i ett engagemang för sjukvårdssystemet som 
helhet och för att resurserna fördelas på ett rimligt och rättvist sätt.  
 
Slutsatser 
Sammantaget visar avhandlingen att både ledare och medarbetare i hälso- och sjukvården är 
medvetna om de ekonomiska krav som ställs på verksamheten och att de är motiverade till att 
bidra till att resurserna används så effektivt som möjligt. Professionens engagemang tycks 
inte primärt styras av lojalitet till den organisation de tillhör, utan mer vara drivet av en 
ansvarskänsla för hälso- och sjukvårdssystemet som helhet och dess förmåga att på ett rimligt 
och rättvist sätt möta patienternas behov, samt erbjuda en hållbar arbetsmiljö för 
professionen.  
Avhandlingen bekräftar vidare den stora betydelsen av den professionella etiken och visar på 
värdet av att ekonomiska styrmodeller är samstämmiga med patientens behov och god 
vårdkvalitet. Avhandlingen bekräftar vidare vikten av att professionella ledare tar hänsyn till 
professionens värderingar och drivkrafter i sitt ledarskap.  
Avhandlingen belyser att professionen, med sin djupa förståelse för patientens väg genom 
vården och för hur sjukvårdssystemet som helhet fungerar, är en värdefull källa till kunskap 
som kan användas i utvärderingar av ekonomiska styrmodeller. Avhandlingen belyser även 
vikten av ökad samverkan i arbetet med att utforma den ekonomiska styrningen och synliggör 
behovet av dialog mellan aktörer såsom beslutsfattare, vårdgivarrepresentanter och 
profession.  
Avhandlingen visar på behovet av att hälso-och sjukvårdssystemets aktörer samlas kring 
gemensamma mål gällande den ekonomiska styrningen. Ökad samverkan skulle kunna 
förbättra förutsättningarna för att skapa ekonomiska styrmodeller som ställer krav på en 
effektiv resursanvändning och samtidigt tillgodoser sjukvårdens uppdrag gällande kvalitet 
och jämlikhet, på ett sätt som gör att professionen uppfattar kraven som ställs på dem som 
rimliga och genomförbara. 
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ekonomiska logik har varit särskilt värdefull och det har känts tryggt att kunna kvalitetssäkra 
en psykologs försök att förstå sig på det här med ekonomi.    
Isis Amer-Wåhlin: Tack för att du har inspirerat med din energi och tilltro till att ingenting är 
omöjligt, särskilt när saker inte blivit riktigt som vi tänkt. Din kunskap om villkoren i vårdens 
vardag har också varit till stor hjälp när vi tillsammans planerat studier och datainsamling.  
Anna Essén: En ordens trollkonstnär, tack för att allt du lärt mig om akademiskt skrivande 
och om hur roligt det är att skriva tillsammans. Du lämnar alltid ett leende efter dig.   
Anne Richter: Tack för all vägledning (och svar på tusen frågor) i arbetet med min 
enkätstudie. Ditt engagemang och din kunskap (och vår gemensamma vurm för tysk struktur 
och ordning) gjorde analysarbetet mycket roligare.  
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fått ställa uppriktiga frågor, som fått uppriktiga svar, om sådant som ibland sägs mellan 
raderna i akademin.  
 
Till mina kollegor  
Carl Johan Sundberg: tack för att du i rollen som prefekt leder institutionen LIME på ett 
energiskt och engagerande sätt.  
Tack Henna Hasson för att du leder Medical Management Center in i framtiden och inspirerar 
med ditt engagemang.  
Tack alla kollegor som befolkar Medical Managent Center och institutionen LIME och bidrar 
till att göra det till en inspirerande och vänlig arbetsplats.  
Jag vill särskilt tacka min forskargrupp PROCOME som är ett fint gäng att få tillhöra. Ett 
särskilt tack till: Annika Bäck, Caroline Lornudd, Sara Ingvarsson, Marta Roczniewska, 
Margit Neher, Mia von Knorring, Kristina Palm, Rebecca Mosson, Hanna Augustsson, 
Robert Lundmark, Susanne Tafvelin och Mandus Frykman. 
Ett varmt tack till alla doktorand-kollegor (inklusive er som numera bär hatt) som hjälpt mig 
framåt i mitt arbete och gjort resan så mycket bättre: Charlotte Klinga, Karin Villaume, Tess 
Söderhjelm, Helena Strehlenert, Håkan Uvhagen, George Keel, Mairi Savage, Anne 
Leppänen, Rafiq Muhammad, Emma Granström, Maria Reinius, Lisa Smeds Alenius, Kerstin 
Belqaid, Marie Dahlberg och Shahnaz Rasouli. Ett särskilt tack till Jens Jacob Fredriksson 
som livat upp både stämningen och koffeinnivåerna i vårt gemensamma arbetsrum.  
Jag vill också särskilt tacka mina kollegor: Sara Tolf, Vibeke Sparring, Pamela Mazzocato, 
Carl Savage, Karin Solberg Carlsson, Carolina Wannheden och Christer Sandahl. 
David Ebbevi: tack för din alltid så klarsynta och kloka återkoppling på mitt arbete.  
Magna Andreen Sachs: för din värme och välvilja och för att du tagit dig tid att berätta om 
hur stora sjukhus fungerar.  
Clas Rehnberg och doktoranderna Sofia Sveréus, Cecilia Dahlgren och Fanny Goude: tack 
för att ni välkomnat mig in i hälsoekonomins värld och för att ni är så trevliga att ha att göra 
med. 
Pär Höglund: för alla intressanta och inspirerande samtal om hur sjukvården kan förbättras.  
Johan Thor: för uppmuntran och alla kloka synpunkter på mitt arbete. Och för tänkvärda 
samtal om vad som gör skillnad i sjukvården.  
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12 APPENDIX  
 
12.1 APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW GUIDE STUDIES I & II 
 
 Bakgrund, kontextuell förståelse 
Vad är din roll, ansvar och mandat i relation till vårdvalsmodellen? 
Har du tidigare erfarenheter av den här typen av styrmodeller? 
 Kunskap och syn på vårdvalsmodellen 
Har du fått information om syfte och bakgrund till modellen? 
Hur såg instruktionerna ut gällande konsekvenserna för verksamheten? 
Har du några generella åsikter om den här typen av styrmodeller/ersättningssystem? 
 Strategier relaterade till vårdvalsmodellen och ersättningssystemet 
Vad infördes – nya rutiner? Vad gjordes annorlunda? 
Vad upphörde – avskaffande av rutiner? 
Har vårdvalsmodellen fått andra konsekvenser för verksamheten? 
 Ledarskap 
Hur har du anpassat ditt ledarskap till styrmodellen? 
Vilka reaktioner har du mött? 
Hur har du bemött dessa? 
 Medarbetarnas motivation och drivkrafter  
Hur tror du att medarbetarnas motivation påverkas av vårdvalsmodellen? 
Har du försökt att påverka deras motivation? Hur? 
Hur tycker du medarbetarnas arbetsmiljö påverkas av vårdvalsmodellen? 
Hur påverkas medarbetarnas behov av kompetensutveckling? 
Hur påverkas medarbetarnas behov av autonomi/självständighet? 
Hur påverkas medarbetarnas relation till patienten och/eller kollegor? 
 
 96 
12.2 APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW GUIDE STUDY IV 
 
 Påverkan på kliniskt beteende 
Den första frågan handlar om hur mycket ni tar hänsyn till ekonomiska krav i ert dagliga 
arbete, hur mycket det påverkar ert beteende.  
Visa enligt illustration: I enkäten ställde vi en fråga som vi tror fångar detta: ”Jag tar hänsyn 
till verksamhetens ekonomi”. Där har ni svarat i genomsnitt 3,3, ni instämmer till viss del. 
Hur kommer det sig att resultatet ser ut såhär? 
Hur tar ni hänsyn till ekonomiska krav i ert kliniska arbete? 
 
 Hur ser era upplevelser ut av balansen mellan ekonomi och patient? 
I enkäten ställde vi en del frågor kring hur ni upplevde balansen mellan de ekonomiska 
resurser som finns och de behov patienterna har.  
Visa enligt illustration: Både med tanke på hela organisationen, med frågor såsom: ”Vi har 
de ekonomiska tillgångar som behövs för att kunna möta patienternas behov” och frågor med 
fokus på ert självbestämmande såsom ”Verksamhetens ekonomiska förutsättningar påverkar 
mina möjligheter att göra det som är bäst för patienten”.  I genomsnitt har ni svarat M= 2,28 
på organisationsnivå, när det gäller den professionella rollen har ni svarat M= 3,31. 
Hur kommer det sig att resultatet ser ut såhär? Hur har man tänkt när man har besvarat de 
här frågorna? 
Vad betyder det här? Är det en tillräckligt bra eller en otillräcklig balans?  
 
 Hur ser upplevelserna ut utifrån kunskap, delaktighet och motivation?  
Nästa fråga handlar om era förutsättningar för att kunna agera på de här kraven. Vi ställde 
frågor om hur mycket man visste om kraven som ställs på en när det kommer till ekonomi, 
hur mycket ni upplever att ni kan påverka ekonomiska frågor, samt hur motiverade och 
engagerade ni känner er i frågor som rör ekonomi. 
Visa enligt illustration: Här svarade ni såhär: När det gäller kunskap ligger medelvärdet 
runt tre (m=3.08).  
En stor grupp håller inte med om att ni är delaktiga, 80 % väljer 1 eller 2, genomsnittet ligger 
strax under två (m= 1,97).  
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När det gäller motivation för de här frågorna så ligger genomsnittet på m=3,08, det finns 
både de som håller med och de som inte håller med.  
Hur kommer det sig att resultatet ser ut såhär? 
Hur har man tänkt när man har besvarat de här frågorna? 
Vad betyder det här? 
 
 Vad skulle kunna påverka upplevelsen? 
Finns det något som skulle få er att ta ännu mer eller ännu mindre hänsyn till ekonomi i ert 
kliniska arbete?  
Finns det något som skulle få er mer eller mindre engagerade i de här frågorna? 
Vad är det som gör de är frågorna engagerande, om de kan bli det? 
 
 Chefens roll? 
Vilken roll spelar chefen för er upplevelse av ekonomiska krav i arbetet? 
Spelar det någon roll vad chefen gör? 
Vad är önskvärt? 
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12.3 APPENDIX C – SWEDISH VERSION OF THE GOV-EQ SCALE STUDY III 
De rubriker som anger namn och innehåll för de olika sub-faktorerna var ej inkluderade i 
enkäten i samband med datainsamling. Instruktions-texterna som föregår frågorna är dock 
identiska med den enkät som användes. Enkätens försättsbrev, som berörde studien syfte samt 
förtydligade förutsättningarna för deltagande och samtycke, har dock exkluderats. 
 
Enkät om upplevelsen av den ekonomiska styrningen av vården 
 
Ekonomi (Subskala A)  
Följande avsnitt handlar om hur du upplever att fokus på ekonomiska frågor i verksamheten 
påverkar dig i ditt arbete. Med ”ekonomiska frågor” menar vi i allmänhet de krav på 
ekonomisk effektivitet som är aktuella i din verksamhet. Det kan innebära många olika saker, 
t.ex. att det finns krav på hur arbetet ska utföras eller riktlinjer för hur ni får använda era 
resurser, såsom material och personal. Med ”verksamhet” menar vi den enhet där du är 
anställd och utför det mesta av ditt arbete, så utgå framförallt från ett enhetsperspektiv när du 
fyller i enkäten. Ange i vilken utsträckning du tycker att följande påståenden stämmer med 
din uppfattning. 
Kunskap & medvetenhet (A) 
Instämmer                      Instämmer 
Inte                                             helt 
1. Jag vet hur jag ska ta hänsyn till verksamhetens ekonomi i mitt arbete. 1       2        3        4        5 
2. Jag vet vad jag ska göra i min roll för att verksamhetens ekonomi ska 
bli så bra som möjligt. 
1       2        3        4        5 
3. Jag har klart för mig hur jag kan hushålla med verksamhetens 
ekonomiska resurser.  
1       2        3        4        5 
4. Jag vet hur jag ska lägga upp mitt arbete för att verksamhetens 
ekonomi ska gå ihop. 
1       2        3        4        5 
5. Jag har svårt att se hur jag kan påverka verksamhetens ekonom (R). 1       2        3        4        5 
6. Jag är medveten om verksamhetens ekonomi i de beslut jag fattar i 
arbetet med patienten. 
1       2        3        4        5 
Delaktighet (A)  
7. Jag känner mig delaktig i frågor som handlar om verksamhetens 
ekonomiska läge. 
1       2        3        4        5 
8. Jag får vara med och påverka hur verksamheten använder sina 
ekonomiska resurser.  
1       2        3        4        5 
9. Jag har möjlighet att tycka till om hur vi tar oss an effektiviseringar av 
verksamheten. 
1       2        3        4        5 
10. Mina åsikter spelar roll när det fattas beslut i ekonomiska frågor.  1       2        3        4        5 
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Motivation (A) 
Instämmer                      Instämmer 
Inte                                             helt 
11. Det är motiverande att arbeta med frågor som rör verksamhetens 
ekonomi.  
1       2        3        4        5 
12. Det är meningsfullt att försöka förbättra verksamhetens ekonomi.  1       2        3        4        5 
13. Jag intresserar mig för det ekonomiska läget i verksamheten.  1       2        3        4        5 
Påverkan på professionell autonomi (A)  
14. Verksamhetens ekonomiska förutsättningar påverkar mina möjligheter 
att göra det som är bäst för patienten. 
1       2        3        4        5 
15. Verksamhetens ekonomiska ramar påverkar mina möjligheter att följa 
mina etiska värderingar 
1       2        3        4        5 
16. Jag känner mig fri att göra det som är bäst för patienten, oavsett 
verksamhetens ekonomi.(R) 
1       2        3        4        5 
Påverkan på kliniskt beteende (A - Enskild fråga)  
22. Jag tar hänsyn till verksamhetens ekonomi i mitt kliniska arbete.  1       2        3        4        5 
 
Följande frågor handlar om hur du i allmänhet uppfattar balansen mellan de ekonomiska 
resurser och det uppdrag ni har i verksamheten. Det är inte säkert att ni på enhetsnivå själva 
kan påverka detta, men vi är intresserade av din upplevelse. Utgå från ett enhetsperspektiv 
när du fyller i enkäten. 
Ange i vilken utsträckning du tycker att följande påståenden stämmer med din uppfattning. 
Organisatorisk samstämmighet mellan resurser och uppdrag (A) 
Instämmer                      Instämmer 
Inte                                             helt 
17. Jag tycker de ekonomiska resurser vi har i verksamheten är rimliga. 1       2        3        4        5 
18. Vi har de ekonomiska tillgångar som behövs för att kunna möta 
patienternas behov. 
1       2        3        4        5 
19. Jag tycker att de ekonomiska förutsättningarna för verksamheten är 
hållbara på lång sikt. 
1       2        3        4        5 
20. Verksamhetens ekonomiska ramar är tillräckliga för att vi ska klara av 
vårt uppdrag. 
1       2        3        4        5 
21. Kraven på verksamhetens ekonomi går ut över våra patienter.(R) 1       2        3        4        5 
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Kvalitet (Subskala B) 
Följande avsnitt handlar om hur du upplever att kvalitetsfrågor hanteras i verksamheten och 
hur det påverkar dig i ditt arbete. Med ”kvalitetsfrågor” menar vi det resultat 
(behandlingsutfall) ni åstadkommer i arbetet med patienterna och hur ni arbetar med 
uppföljning och förbättringsarbete. Utgå framförallt från ett enhetsperspektiv när du fyller i 
enkäten. Ange i vilken utsträckning du tycker att följande påståenden stämmer med din 
uppfattning. 
Kunskap & medvetenhet (B) 
Instämmer                      Instämmer 
Inte                                             helt 
23. Jag vet vad som bidrar till god kvalitet för våra patienter.  1       2        3        4        5 
24. Jag vet vad jag kan göra i min roll för att vi ska hålla en så hög 
kvalitet som möjligt.  
1       2        3        4        5 
25. Jag har klart för mig hur jag kan engagera mig i förbättringsarbete. 1       2        3        4        5 
26. Jag vet hur jag ska lägga upp mitt arbete för att det ska bli god 
kvalitet i det jag gör.  
1       2        3        4        5 
Delaktighet (B)  
27. Jag får vara med och påverka hur verksamheten jobbar med 
kvalitetsfrågor. 
1       2        3        4        5 
28. Jag känner mig delaktig i verksamhetens förbättringsarbete. 1       2        3        4        5 
29. Jag har möjlighet att påverka var vi lägger fokus i förbättringsarbetet.  1       2        3        4        5 
30. Mina åsikter spelar roll när vi arbetar med kvalitetsfrågor. 1       2        3        4        5 
31. När vi ska jobba med förbättringsarbete är det redan bestämt hur det 
ska göras.(R) 
1       2        3        4        5 
32. Jag har svårt att se hur jag kan påverka kvaliteten i verksamheten (R) 1       2        3        4        5 
Motivation (B)  
33. Det är motiverande att arbeta med förbättringsarbete.  1       2        3        4        5 
34. Jag tycker att det ingår i min roll att engagera mig i hur vi kan 
förbättra kvaliteten i verksamheten.  
1       2        3        4        5 
35. Det är meningsfullt att försöka förbättra kvaliteten i verksamheten.  1       2        3        4        5 
36. Jag intresserar mig för hur vi ligger till kvalitetsmässigt jämfört med 
andra verksamheter.  
1       2        3        4        5 
Påverkan på kliniskt beteende (B – Enskild fråga)  
37. Jag tar hänsyn till verksamhetens kvalitet i mitt kliniska arbete. 1       2        3        4        5 
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